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1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
The attention given to market-based policy instruments to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions has materially increased in the recent years. The idea is to require polluters to
acquire a right for each ton of greenhouse gas they emit, and to cap the overall num-
ber of available rights. Starting from an initial allocation, these rights, called emission
permits, can be traded among the polluters and other investors. Under perfect market
conditions, an efficient allocation of the emission permits is attained, such that emis-
sions are realized where it is most costly to abate them, and the emission reductions that
are necessary to comply with the cap are achieved at lowest cost for the economy.1 The
public perception of such cap-and-trade systems2 is controversial. Supporters empha-
size that these instruments promote economic efficiency — to achieve environmental
objectives at lowest possible cost — combined with a sufficient amount of flexibility to
be compatible to intergovernmental political processes,3 and consider emissions trad-
ing as the key instrument to combat climate change (Stavins 2011). Opponents doubt
the ability of emission trading systems to generate permanent incentives for abatement
and environment-friendly investments through their price signals and feel vindicated by
the problems that some established emission trading systems are currently facing.4 The
1The concept of emissions trading was developed by the seminal works of Coase (1960), Crocker (1966),
Dales (1968), and Montgomery (1972), among many others. Taschini (2009) provides an overview of the
related literature.
2This thesis focuses on cap-and-trade systems as the most prominent form of emission trading systems.
There are also alternative designs of emission trading schemes, for example baseline-and-credit systems.
See Boom and Dijkstra (2009) for an overview and comparison of both types of systems.
3Both, theoretical and empirical work shows that market-based approaches achieve environmental objec-
tives at lower cost than conventional command-and-control systems (see Montgomery 1972; Cronshaw
and Kruse 1996; Rubin 1996 as well as Carlson et al. 2000; Burtraw et al. 2005). Paterson (2012) elabo-
rates on the advantageous properties of emission trading systems from a political perspective.
4We discuss challenges that existing emission trading systems are currently facing in the conclusion and
outlook of this thesis in Section 6.
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general skepticism against market mechanisms has been fueled further by the recent
financial crisis and its economic consequences.
Notwithstanding these objections, mandatory emission trading schemes have recently
been introduced on international, national, or domestic levels all over the world: in the
European Union, for several states of the US, in New Zealand and Australia, for the
metropolitan area of Tokyo, and the list will grow in the coming years. With them, the
financial market for emission permits has experienced tremendous growth, with a global
transaction volume of USD 176 billion in 2011.5 The emission permit market is of great
relevance for various agents and brings along a number of financial and economic issues
related to this new asset class. According to the nature of an emission trading system,
polluting companies trade in the market to satisfy their demand for emission permits,
and are exposed to related price risk. Managing this risk requires detailed knowledge
of the fine structure of permit prices and also involves the use of derivatives written on
emission permits, such as futures and options. Trading in derivatives markets, however,
gives rise to the need for suitable valuation approaches. Furthermore, the existence of
an emission trading system fosters investments into environment-friendly technologies
and projects. Polluters have to assess their investment opportunities based on the price
signals given by the market, and make decisions on which projects to realize and on
their timing strategy. On the other side, it is of great interest for the regulator to de-
sign the emission trading system in such way that it creates a permanent incentive for
sustainable investments. Besides these original objectives, emission permits and re-
lated derivatives also provide a promising option for diversification to institutional and
private investors. It stands to reason that emission permit prices are driven by differ-
ent factors than stocks, bonds, or classical commodities. Sound investment strategies,
however, require a good understanding of the risk profile of these instruments.
Although these issues appear very diverse, they all depend critically on the stochastic
behavior of the underlying asset prices, as is widely recognized in the classical finance
and commodity literature.6 More precisely, important questions are:
• What kind of permit price behavior is induced by the design of today’s cap-and-
trade systems?
5See Kossoy and Guigon (2012).
6In the finance literature on commodities, important studies dealing with these issues are Brennan and
Schwartz (1985), Schwartz (1997), Routledge et al. (2000), Schwartz and Smith (2000), Casassus and
Collin-Dufresne (2005), and Trolle and Schwartz (2009).
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• How does the futures price curve look like?
• How should market models be specified to capture the characteristics of permit
prices appropriately?
• How are derivatives priced in this market?
• What is the short-term impact of news?
This thesis contributes to these questions both from a theoretical and an empirical per-
spective. In the existing theoretical literature, equilibrium models for emissions mar-
kets are developed either under certainty (e.g., Cronshaw and Kruse 1996; Rubin 1996;
Schennach 2000), or under uncertainty but for a set of regulatory rules that do not com-
pletely match the actual rules of state-of-the-art cap-and-trade systems (Seifert et al.
2008; Cetin and Verschuere 2009; Carmona et al. 2009, 2010; Kijima et al. 2010; Ches-
ney and Taschini 2012). Consequently, these approaches explain basic effects in this
market within a simplified setting, but are not entirely suitable to investigate the specific
stochastic properties of permit prices induced by the design of today’s emission trading
systems. We study the characteristics of emission permit prices as well as futures and
related derivatives within an equilibrium model for emissions markets that captures all
important design features of current emission trading systems.
On the empirical side, several existing studies investigate the properties of emission
permit spot, futures, and option prices by calibrating standard models like geomet-
ric Brownian motion, jump-diffusion, mean-reverting, regime-switching, or stochastic
volatility models to market data (Wagner 2007; Paolella and Taschini 2008; Benz and
Tru¨ck 2009; Daskalakis et al. 2009; Frey 2010). In contrast, Gru¨ll and Taschini (2009)
and Carmona and Hinz (2011) propose reduced-form market models that account for
the specific properties of emission permits and are still feasible for calibration to futures
or option prices. We provide a generic extension of these approaches to a reduced-form
model framework, calibrate a battery of model variants to futures and option price data,
and evaluate the performance of different specifications with respect to historical model
fit and option pricing performance.
Furthermore, we are the first to study the general impact of the yearly emissions an-
nouncement, an outstanding news event in the European emissions market. Related
effects are considered up to now only for one or two selected events (Chevallier et al.
2009; Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo 2009; Gru¨ll and Kiesel 2012). We consider the
3
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emissions announcements from 2007 to 2012 to investigate the impact of this event
on prices, volumes, intraday volatilities, and option-implied volatilities of European
permit futures.
1.2. Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is structured as follows.
Chapter 2 gives a concise overview of existing and proposed emission trading schemes
worldwide and introduces the regulatory features of today’s cap-and-trade systems. We
describe the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) as the world’s largest emission
trading system in more detail, with a special focus on the financial instruments that are
traded within this system.
In Chapter 3, we propose a stochastic equilibrium model for emissions markets that
accounts for all important design features of today’s emission trading systems.7 Regu-
lated companies reduce their emissions by implementing abatement measures and trade
emission permits in the market. We characterize an emission permit as a strip of Eu-
ropean binary options written on economy-wide cumulative emissions. Exploiting this
option analogy, we derive several general properties of the spot and futures price dy-
namics of emission permits. We calibrate the model to a setting in accordance with the
EU ETS and investigate the specific properties of permit prices, volatilities, and their
dependency on abatement costs and future compliance periods. Based on a simulation
study, we further shed light on the characteristic properties of the volatility smile in this
market.
Chapter 4 simplifies the permit price dynamics derived in Chapter 3 by specifying the
dynamics of economy-wide cumulative emissions exogenously, following the reduced-
form approach by Carmona and Hinz (2011).8 We obtain a framework of reduced-form
models for the permit price dynamics that accounts for the specific properties of emis-
sion permits and is still feasible for calibration to futures or option prices. For historical
calibration to spot or futures prices, we develop a general estimation approach based
on the unscented Kalman filter. Option pricing formulae are derived in our framework
7Chapter 3 is based on the working paper Hitzemann and Uhrig-Homburg (2013b).
8Chapter 4 builds on the working paper Hitzemann and Uhrig-Homburg (2013a).
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along the lines of Carmona and Hinz (2011). We calibrate a battery of model variants
to historical futures prices to evaluate their empirical performance. Furthermore, we
analyze the in- and out-of-sample option pricing performance based on implicit cali-
bration.
Chapter 5 focusses on the short-term dynamics of emission permit prices related to the
annual announcement of emissions realized in the previous year.9 We investigate the
impact of this event on the European carbon market with respect to abnormal returns,
trading volumes, intraday volatilities, and option-implied volatilities.
Chapter 6 summarizes the thesis and gives an outlook to possible future research.
9Chapter 5 is based on the working paper Hitzemann et al. (2013).
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2. Emissions Trading: Current
State
2.1. Emissions Trading Around the World
The foundation of global emissions trading is the Kyoto Protocol,10 which was adopted
in December 1997 to supplement the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (UNFCCC). It defines limits on the amount of greenhouse gases to be
emitted in the years from 2008 to 2012 for several countries listed in Annex I of the
UNFCCC.11 The Kyoto Protocol does not require, however, that all Annex I countries
comply with their limits on an individual basis as long as the aggregate emissions do not
exceed the overall cap. Countries are allowed to transfer parts of their assigned amount
to other countries if they over-achieve their emission reduction goal, and the other coun-
tries are consequently allowed to emit more according to the increased amount.12 These
rules establish International Emissions Trading (IET) in the form of a cap-and-trade
system. The amount of emissions allowed to the countries is represented by a number
of tradable Assigned Amount Units (AAUs), which are emission permits for one ton of
carbon dioxide equivalent each.13 Besides AAUs, the Kyoto Protocol introduces three
other kinds of emission permits: Emission Reduction Units (ERUs), Certified Emission
Reductions (CERs), and Removal Units (RMUs). ERUs arise from Joint Implementa-
tion (JI) projects in which an Annex I party invests into an emission reduction project
that is hosted by another Annex I country. For compensation, AAUs from the host coun-
try are converted into ERUs and credited to the investing party. Similarly, CERs can
10See United Nations (1998).
11The limits are defined in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol.
12See Article 3 and Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol.
13Greenhouse gas emissions are usually expressed in carbon dioxide equivalent, i.e., the amount of all green-
house gases measured by their accelerating effect on global warming is translated to the amount of carbon
dioxide that would cause the same effect when no other greenhouse gases are emitted to the atmosphere.
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be awarded to an investing Annex I party for participating in projects in Non-Annex I
countries under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Finally, forestation ac-
tivities are considered separately from other measures to emission reduction and are
compensated by RMUs.14 While ERUs do not change the overall amount of emissions
allowed to Annex I parties, RMUs and CERs add to this amount. The differentiation
between AAUs and the other Kyoto units is necessary with regard to the supplementar-
ity principle of the Kyoto protocol, which says that countries are supposed to achieve
their emission reduction goals predominantly by domestic emission reductions, while
other measures are only supplemental.15 In consequence, the use of ERUs, CERs, and
RMUs for compliance in the current and following commitment periods of the Kyoto
Protocol is restricted, while AAUs are generally usable.16
The idea of greenhouse gas emissions trading has been adapted in the recent years
to introduce international, national, or domestic emission trading systems all over the
world.17 Some of these systems are directly linked to the Kyoto framework and pass
on emission limits to the countries’ industry sectors, while others are independent and
pursue individual emission reduction goals. As highlighted by Figure 2.1, the EU ETS
is the most significant emission trading system both in terms of the amount of emission
permits allocated per year and the transaction volume. It was launched in 2005 and
covers about 40% of the overall greenhouse gas emissions of the 27 EU member states,
plus Croatia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway.18 Starting with the power sector and
energy-intensive industries, the scheme is steadily extended and includes the aviation
sector since 2012 and several further industries by 2013. The domestic emission permits
traded within the EU ETS are called European Union Allowances (EUAs) and stand
for one ton of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions each. Furthermore, the EU ETS is
14The JI mechanism is defined in Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM in Article 12. Article 3.3 states
the rules for land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) measures.
15The supplementarity principle is introduced by Article 6.1 (d), Article 12.3 (b), and Article 17 of the Kyoto
Protocol.
16We refer to Betz et al. (2005) for further details on the eligibility of different Kyoto units for compliance.
For an excellent overview of the legal framework of international and regional emissions trading see
Freestone and Streck (2009).
17The overview of different emission trading systems given in this section incorporates related information
from the reports by Hood (2010), Perdan and Azapagic (2011), Kossoy and Guigon (2012), and the
International Emissions Trading Association (2012).
18Important regulations are Directive 2003/87/EC (see European Parliament and Council 2003) as well as
the amending Directive 2009/29/EC (see European Parliament and Council 2009) and the Linking Direc-
tive 2004/101/EC (see European Parliament and Council 2004). A comprehensive outline of the system
is given in the brochure of the European Commission (2008b). Further information is provided on the
official website http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/.
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Figure 2.1.: Size of the most significant emission trading systems with respect to the
amount of allocated permits in 2011, the proposed allocation for 2015,
and the transaction volume in 2011, denoted in terms of the correspond-
ing amount of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) emissions. Transaction
volumes include spot and forward transactions and are provided by Kossoy
and Guigon (2012). EU ETS is the EU Emissions Trading System, RGGI
stands for the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, CA ETS is the Cali-
fornia Emissions Trading Scheme, Quebec stands for the emission trading
system in Quebec, and NZ ETS is the New Zealand Emissions Trading
Scheme.
linked to the Kyoto mechanisms by allowing to use ERUs and CERs to a certain extent
equivalently to European Union Allowances (EUAs) for compliance. We refer to the
EU ETS as an example of application for our theoretical model in Chapter 3, and for
our empirical analysis in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. Therefore, we consider the specific
design features and regulations of the EU ETS in detail in Section 2.3.
In North America there are two significant emission trading initiatives, the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and the Western Climate Initiative (WCI). Both are
inter-regional initiatives — an attempt to establish mandatory US-wide emissions trad-
ing failed when the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 200919 was approved
by the House of Representatives, but not by the Senate. The RGGI launched an emis-
sion trading system in 2009 that covers emissions from the electricity sector of nine US
19See 111th United States Congress (2009).
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states along the East Coast.20 From its introduction, the scheme had to deal with severe
over-allocation problems, and trading had broken down consequently. A comprehen-
sive review of the RGGI was conducted in 2012 with the result that the member states
agreed on a reduction of the cap by 45%, which has revitalized the market again.21 The
WCI is a coalition of the state of California and the four Canadian provinces British
Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec. It was initiated in 2007 with the intention to
collaborate on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in the member states.22 Both
California and Quebec are operating a mandatory cap-and-trade system since the begin-
ning of 2013. The California Emissions Trading Scheme (CA ETS) includes emissions
from the power sector and large industries from the beginning and is extended in 2015,
especially to the transport sector.23 It thereby covers 85% of California’s greenhouse
gas emissions, which makes it to the second largest emission trading scheme in the
world (see Figure 2.1). In anticipation of the first compliance period starting in 2013,
first forward contracts on California Carbon Allowances (CCAs) were traded as early
as in August 2011. Quebec’s emission trading scheme is designed very similarly to
the CA ETS, and Quebec and California will link their schemes by the beginning of
2014.24 Due to the withdrawal of the United States and Canada from the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, the Northern American emission trading systems are not linked to the Kyoto
mechanisms.
A number of developments related to carbon emissions trading are also observable in
Australia and New Zealand. Already on January 1, 2003, the Australian State of New
South Wales introduced the Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme (GGAS), a baseline-
and-credit system to reduce carbon emissions of the electricity sector.25 It was closed at
the end of June 201226 and is superseded by the Australia-wide Carbon Pricing Mecha-
20These states are Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York,
Rhode Island, and Vermont. Further information is provided on http://www.rggi.org.
21This review was scheduled already in 2005, see Article 6.D of the Memorandum of Understanding for the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (2005). The results were published in February 2013 by the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (2013).
22See Western Regional Climate Action Initiative (2007).
23See Table II-1 of the cap-and-trade regulation of the California Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (2010). Further information is provided on the official website
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm.
24See the related regulations adopted by the California Environmental Protection Agency (2013).
25Related information is available on http://www.greenhousegas.nsw.gov.au.
26See New South Wales Government (2012).
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nism (CPM) since July 2012. The CPM is established by the Clean Energy Act 201127
that was adopted in view of the goal to reduce Australia’s emissions by at least 80%
until 2050, compared to the year 2000. It introduces a cap-and-trade system that covers
about 60% of Australia’s carbon dioxide emissions.28 The CPM, however, starts with
a 3-year period during which Australian Carbon Units (CUs) — the domestic emission
permits needed for compliance under the CPM — can be acquired at a fixed price of
AUD 23 per ton.29 After that, price flexibility is increased in two steps: From July
2015 to July 2018, prices are flexible and determined by the market, but the fluctuation
is bounded by a predefined price floor and ceiling. The price floor is set to AUD 15,
while the ceiling is linked to international carbon prices, defined to be AUD 20 above
the prevailing CER price. From July 2018 on, prices can fluctuate freely.30 Like the EU
ETS, the CPM is linked to the Kyoto mechanisms and allows the use of Kyoto units
for compliance for up to 50% of a company’s emissions as of 2015.31 In New Zealand,
the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ ETS) is in operation already since
2008, but was subject to a major revision enacted in December 2009.32 In particular,
a transition phase for the scheme was set from July 2010 to December 2012, during
which regulated companies were able to buy New Zealand Units (NZUs) for a fixed
price of NZD 25 and use each NZU for two tons of emissions, while an NZU usually
only covers one ton. Alternatively, compliance can be achieved by using Kyoto units
without any limit, which strongly links the NZ ETS to international carbon prices.
More or less concrete plans to establish carbon emissions trading exist in many other
parts of the world. Most notably, the Republic of Korea has passed a bill that establishes
a nation-wide emissions trading scheme by 2015. Countries like China, Japan, and
Brazil underpin their ambitions to establish emissions trading by setting up domestic
27The Clean Energy Act 2011 (see Australian Government 2011) is part of the Clean Energy Legislative
Package, see http://www.cleanenergyfuture.gov.au. A previously proposed emission trad-
ing scheme, the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS), was rejected by the Senate.
28See Australian Government (2012).
29In this sense, the CPM effectively implements a carbon tax for the first three years. The comparison of
such price-based mechanisms to quantity-based mechanisms like emissions trading is in the focus of the
seminal work by Weitzman (1974).
30Related rules are defined in Section 100 of the Clean Energy Act 2011, the price floor is specified in Section
111. It starts at AUD 15 and increases to AUD 16 and AUD 17.05 in the following years.
31See Section 121 of the Clean Energy Act 2011.
32Corresponding regulations are the Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading) Amendment Act 2008
(see New Zealand Government 2008) and the Climate Change Response (Moderated Emissions Trading)
Amendment Bill (see New Zealand Government 2009). Further information is available on the website
http://www.climatechange.govt.nz/emissions-trading-scheme/.
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schemes on a mandatory or voluntary basis. Japan has launched mandatory emissions
trading in the metropolitan area of Tokyo in 2010, and Brazil starts a scheme in the state
of Rio de Janeiro in 2013 and plans another one in Sa˜o Paulo. China is working on the
introduction of voluntary pilot emissions trading systems in several cities and regions.
The success of such pilot projects and the developments of the global emissions market
will decide about the permanent establishment of emissions trading in these and many
other countries.
2.2. Design of Cap-and-Trade Systems
The design of sensible, cost-effective cap-and-trade systems involves a number of deci-
sions on different dimensions.33 Once the scope of the system is defined, in particular
the geographical coverage, the regulated industries, and the greenhouse gases that are
included,34 the regulator has to decide on the design of the temporal dimension as well
as the allocation and enforcement mechanism of the system. Currently established or
proposed cap-and-trade systems are designed in a very similar fashion with respect to
these aspects, as we point out in the following.
On the temporal dimension, the regulator defines compliance periods and sets a cap
on the emission volume within these periods based on predefined reduction goals. An
important design issue is the choice between few longer compliance periods and many
short ones. While a system with many short periods provides more flexibility to the reg-
ulator to align caps on a short-term basis, it constrains the timing flexibility of regulated
companies for emission reductions. Moreover, short compliance periods generally lead
to a higher volatility of emission permit prices, which delays and reduces irreversible in-
vestments into carbon-friendly technologies.35 It is, however, possible to increase price
stability in a system with multiple short compliance periods by allowing to transfer
emission permits between different periods. As Fankhauser and Hepburn (2010a) note,
one long compliance period is obviously equivalent to multiple short compliance peri-
33A very detailed discussion of the different design options can be found in Tietenberg (2006).
34This thesis focusses on the design of emission trading systems on the temporal dimension and its impli-
cations for the stochastic behavior of emission permit prices. Nevertheless, the definition of the scope of
an emission trading scheme is a complex decision involving a number of different criteria. We refer to
Chapter 4 of Tietenberg (2006) and Fankhauser and Hepburn (2010b) for an overview of design issues on
the spatial dimension.
35This follows from standard results of real options theory, see Pindyck (1988).
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ods between which permits are transferable unlimitedly. Current cap-and-trade systems
allow to carry over current emission permits to following compliance periods (banking).
To the contrary, it is usually prohibited to use permits from future allocations in earlier
compliance periods (borrowing) due to adverse incentives that come along with it.36 On
the one hand, companies might tend to postpone the implementation of abatement mea-
sures and borrow permits instead, especially when it is likely that emission reduction
targets are relaxed for future compliance periods. On the other hand, firms effectively
become debtors when borrowing emission permits, which increases their incentive to
campaign for abandoning emissions trading such that their debt gets waived. It also
imposes additional complexity to the regulator to evaluate if a company will be able to
pay borrowed permits back. Especially in emission trading systems that are intended
to have an infinite horizon, unlimited borrowing is not sensible because “repayments”
could always be deferred to the future.
For each of the compliance periods, the regulator allocates emission permits to the par-
ticipants of the system according to the predefined cap. Permits are either distributed
for free or through an auction mechanism.37 In case of free allocation, it is most con-
ventional to distribute permits by grandfathering, which means that future allocations
to a polluter are based on his historical emissions. Under idealized conditions, the ini-
tial allocation is of minor importance since any possible allocation leads to an efficient
outcome of the system.38 This does not hold, however, under imperfect (and more
realistic) conditions as shown by Stavins (1995) and Goulder et al. (1997), for exam-
ple. Especially grandfathering can create incentives for higher emissions in order to get
more permits for free in the future.39 On the other hand, the introduction of emission
trading systems in the past has shown that a free allocation of permits is politically
more feasible.40 To connect the strengths of both approaches, current emission trading
systems usually start with a small proportion of auctioned permits for the first periods,
before increasing the amount auctioned step by step for future allocations.41
36See Fankhauser and Hepburn (2010a).
37A more detailed overview of different allocation procedures is given by Tietenberg (2006), Chapter 6.
Different auction mechanisms in particular are considered by Cramton and Kerr (2002).
38See Montgomery (1972), Theorem 3.3.
39This issue is raised by Hepburn et al. (2006) and Zapfel (2007) in the context of the EU ETS. Harstad and
Eskeland (2010) model this aspect as a signaling game.
40See Schmalensee et al. (1998).
41Exact figures on the auctioning amount in current emission trading systems are given by Perdan and Aza-
pagic (2011), Table 1.
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By the end of a compliance period, companies are obliged to cover their emissions with
a sufficient number of permits, either originating from their initial allocation or ac-
quired from other participants. To enforce compliance, it is usual to impose a monetary
penalty on companies whose emissions exceed the amount of permits. Current emission
trading systems penalize each ton of exceeding emissions with a constant amount.42 In
addition, lacking permits have to be delivered in the next compliance period.
Given these basic components of a cap-and-trade system, participants trade emission
permits among each other, and prices result from their demand for permits needed
to avoid penalties. Although the aspect of price stability is taken into account when
designing these basic components, prices can in principal fluctuate freely, so that high
volatilities or particularly low or high prices cannot be completely inhibited. Therefore,
approaches are developed that restrict price flexibility by adding a price floor, price cap,
or both of them (i.e., a price collar) to a cap-and-trade system. Gru¨ll and Taschini (2011)
give an overview of such design options and show that all these hybrid approaches can
be decomposed into an ordinary cap-and-trade scheme (without these features) and a
number of different financial options written on emission permits that are allocated
to the participants. Studying emission trading systems with restricted price flexibility
thus naturally involves the analysis of ordinary cap-and-trade systems, enhanced by the
financial options standing for the particular price restriction.
Finally, an aspect that gains importance with the increasing number of emission trad-
ing systems around the world is the linkage of different schemes. By linking different
emission trading systems, the flexibility for abatements is increased, making it possible
to achieve the aggregate reduction goals at lower overall cost. Moreover, it increases
liquidity on related markets. These potentials can obviously be exploited in the most
complete way if schemes are integrated by a bilateral link that allows to transfer permits
in both directions (see Mehling and Haites 2009). However, this requires the coordi-
nation of policy-makers in order to ensure the compatibility of the linked systems. For
example, if a scheme that prohibits banking of permits is bilaterally linked to a sys-
tem with unlimited banking, then banking becomes effectively allowed in the former
scheme by transferring permits forwards and backwards. A much more flexible solution
is to link systems unilaterally, so that permits can be transferred between the systems
only in one direction. As an example, the link of the EU ETS to the Kyoto mechanisms
42The properties of a constant penalty compared to different penalty structures are investigated by Stranlund
(2007).
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is unilateral, since Kyoto units can be used for compliance within the EU ETS, but
EUAs are not usable under the Kyoto Protocol.
2.3. EU Emissions Trading System
2.3.1. Specific Design Features
As the world’s largest emission trading system, the EU ETS is the main example of
application in this thesis when it comes to model calibration and empirical analysis. It
was launched in 2005 and started with a trial period from 2005 to 2007 (Phase I) under
relaxed conditions. Particularly, the penalty was set to 40 Euros for each ton of ex-
ceeding emissions instead of 100 Euros, and the amount of emission permits allocated
to the regulated companies was fairly generous. As a consequence, there were a lot of
leftover EUAs not needed for compliance, leading to a price collapse because banking
into the next compliance period was prohibited at the end of Phase I. That effectively
meant a restart of the scheme with the beginning of the compliance period from 2008
to 2012 (Phase II). This period coincides with the first commitment period of the Kyoto
Protocol and is followed by compliance periods from 2013 to 2020 (Phase III), 2021
to 2028 (Phase IV), and further eight year periods.43 It is explicitly allowed to bank
permits within and, as of Phase II, also between compliance periods. Borrowing is pro-
hibited between different compliance periods, but it is possible within a period due to
the system’s yearly schedule: Permits have to be surrendered by April 30 of the fol-
lowing year,44 while the annual allocation process is completed by February 28 at the
latest.45 Since EUAs of the same compliance period are not distinguishable, this makes
it possible to borrow up to the amount allocated in the following year. At realistic emis-
sion levels, this allows to cover potentially exceeding emissions within a compliance
period by borrowing, such that penalties only accrue at the very end of a period.46
The allocation of emission permits in Phase I and Phase II is carried out by the indi-
vidual member states based on National Allocation Plans (NAPs). A NAP specifies the
43See MEMO/08/796 of the European Commission (2008c).
44See Article 12 of Directive 2003/87/EC.
45See Article 11 of Directive 2009/29/EC.
46This simplification cannot be made if there is a significant probability that permits allocated for the current
and the following year are completely needed to cover emissions of the current year because borrowing
from later years is not allowed.
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amount of EUAs to be allocated and to which extent the permits are auctioned to the
participants of the system. Permits that are not auctioned are distributed for free, at least
95% (90%) of the permits in Phase I (II).47 Further, member states have to ensure that
their plans are in line with the targets of the Kyoto Protocol and other relevant agree-
ments.48 NAPs are submitted to the European Commission and can be rejected if they
are not in line with these terms. As of Phase III, NAPs are replaced by an EU-wide cap
defining the overall amount of allocated EUAs49 and a “harmonised” allocation proce-
dure for all member states.50 The cap amounts to about 2.04 billion permits for 2013
and declines annually by 37.4 million EUAs.51 According to the “harmonised” alloca-
tion procedure, the proportion of this cap that is allocated for free is determined based
on National Implementation Measures (NIMs).52 For that, each member state compiles
a list of regulated installations and submits it to the European Commission. An amount
of EUAs is assigned to each installation based on the emissions of a corresponding
benchmark installation, set at the “average performance of the 10% most efficient in-
stallations.”53 Of this benchmark amount, 80% are allocated for free in 2013, and this
proportion decreases to 30% by 2020. From 2027 on, no further EUAs will be allocated
for free.54 The part of the cap that is not allocated for free is auctioned by the member
states.55
After allocation, EUA holdings are managed within electronic databases called reg-
istries. Transferring an emission permit from one account to another is a simple elec-
tronic procedure which involves to change the corresponding entries in the registry.
All transactions are monitored by an independent transaction log.56 Until 2012, each
member state hosted a national registry, and transfers between accounts from different
countries were coordinated by the Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL).
47See Article 10 of Directive 2003/87/EC.
48See Article 9 and Annex III of Directive 2003/87/EC.
49See Article 9 of Directive 2009/29/EC.
50See Article 10a of Directive 2009/29/EC.
51This amount is equivalent to 1.74% of the average yearly allocation in Phase II, as stated by Decision
2010/634/EU of the European Commission (2010a).
52See Article 11 of Directive 2009/29/EC.
53See Article 10a(2) of Directive 2009/29/EC.
54Exceptions are installations from the power generation sector which do generally not get any free alloca-
tion, and industries that are likely to be affected by carbon leakage, getting all permits for free. These
rules are specified in the amendments to Article 10a, especially numbers 1, 11, and 12, in Directive
2009/29/EC, together with MEMO/10/338 of the European Commission (2010c).
55See Article 10 of Directive 2009/29/EC.
56See Article 19 and 20 of Directive 2003/87/EC.
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Several national registries were under attack by cyber-criminals in 2011 who stole
EUAs of about 50 million Euros by transferring allowances from hacked accounts.57
In response to that, the EU Commission revised the existing registry infrastructure by
replacing the national registries with a single Union Registry which works under en-
hanced security standards.58 The Union Registry is in operation since June 20, 2012.
The CITL is superseded by the European Union Transaction Log (EUTL), which fills
the same role for the Union Registry.
The registry also handles the compliance procedure, to balance the companies’ emis-
sions with a sufficient number of EUAs. For that, companies are obliged to monitor
their emissions over the year, and to report them by March 31 of the following year.59
After verification, a corresponding amount of EUAs is surrendered and deleted from
the account in the registry. If too few permits are surrendered, a penalty of 100 Euros
is incurred for each ton of exceeding emissions in Phase II, and the penalty increases
“in accordance with the European index of consumer prices”60 for subsequent compli-
ance periods. Additionally, companies are required to deliver the lacking permits in the
following year.61 Aggregated information on the realized emissions of regulated com-
panies is released to the public every year since 2006, with an announcement date in
early April since 2007.62 The effects of this news event on the European carbon market
are in the focus of our analysis in Chapter 5.
2.3.2. Markets and Products
European Union Allowances and related derivatives are traded on several exchanges
across Europe as well as over-the-counter. In 2011, 49% of all trades related to the
European carbon market were processed through exchanges, and 51% through brokers
or bilaterally.63 Interestingly, the spot market accounts for only 2% of the overall EUA
transaction volume,64 and most of the trading (around 88% in 2011) takes place in EUA
57See Kossoy and Guigon (2012).
58See Regulation 1193/2011 of the European Commission (2011a).
59See Article 15 of Directive 2003/87/EC.
60See Article 16(4) of Directive 2009/29/EC.
61See Article 16 of Directive 2003/87/EC.
62The data is published on the website of the CITL/EUTL, see
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets/.
63See Kossoy and Guigon (2012).
64The largest spot exchange in 2011 was BlueNext, accounting for 62% of the spot trading volume according
to their own statements.
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Figure 2.2.: Yearly trading volumes of the six most liquid EUA futures contracts on the
European Climate Exchange (ECX). Volumes are denoted in thousands of
futures contracts traded, with a contract size of 1,000 EUAs per contract.
futures.65 While a predominant role of the futures market is typical for markets in which
physical delivery or storage of the spot asset is particularly complicated or costly, the
delivery of an EUA only involves an electronic transfer in the registry.66 A possible
explanation for the low spot trading volumes is that futures trading ties up less capital
and polluting companies do not need to own EUAs at any other time than right before
the compliance date at the end of April. Thus, they can adjust their permit holdings for
compliance through futures contracts and do not have to engage in spot market trading
(see Daskalakis et al. 2011). On top of that, the cyber-theft incidents have damaged the
reputation of the spot market. On the one hand, it was unclear if holders of spot EUAs
would be held liable for possessing stolen permits. On the other hand, registries were
closed after these incidents for some time, so that spot markets had to be suspended.
Finally, with the migration to the Union Registry a delay of 26 hours was introduced
between the initiation of a trade and its final completion. This delay is abolished again
with the introduction of trusted account lists.67
65See Kossoy and Guigon (2012).
66BlueNext used to carry out the delivery of an EUA within 15 minutes, see Daskalakis et al. (2011).
67See Article 24 and 36(3) of Regulation 1193/2011.
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Figure 2.3.: Daily EUA futures prices from January 2008 to June 2012 provided by
the ECX. The futures price series is constructed by taking the December
contract next to maturity and rolling over to the next contract on the last
day of October.
The most important trading venue for EUA futures is the European Climate Exchange
(ECX) with a market share of more than 92%, which makes it also to the world’s largest
carbon futures exchange.68 EUA futures are available with quarterly expiries on the last
Monday of March, June, September, and December for the first years, and with yearly
expiry in December up to 2020. Considering the trading volumes of the different futures
in Figure 2.2 clearly reveals that the December contract next to maturity is always
traded with highest liquidity. It is generally followed by the December contracts with
longer maturities in corresponding order. As an exception, the December 2012 contract
has a special role because its maturity date almost coincides with the end of Phase II,
and it is traded more liquidly than some of the shorter maturities. Futures not maturing
in December account only for small parts of the overall trading volume.
In line with these observations, the empirical parts of this thesis (Chapter 4 and Chap-
ter 5) build on a time series constructed by taking the EUA December futures next to
68The ECX is operated by IntercontinentalExchange (ICE), see http://www.theice.com.
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Figure 2.4.: Yearly trading volumes of the six most liquidly traded maturities of EUA
futures options on the European Climate Exchange (ECX). Volumes are
denoted in thousands of options traded. One EUA futures option allows to
enter one EUA futures contract at expiry.
maturity and rolling over to the next contract on the last day of October. Although fu-
tures maturing within the same compliance period are completely linked by the standard
cost-of-carry relationship,69 price information from the most liquid contract should be
least affected by equilibrium errors caused by market microstructure effects. Figure 2.3
illustrates EUA futures prices from 2008 to June 2012. Prices first rose up to a high
of 29.33 Euros in July 2008, before they plummeted in consequence of the financial
crisis and the subsequent economic downturn. Since then prices are less volatile, but
still cover a range from 6 to 17.50 Euros.
Besides EUA futures, the most important derivatives in the European carbon market are
European options written on these futures. Options on all futures contracts are avail-
able and expire three trading days before the futures’ maturity. The trading volumes of
options with different maturities on the ECX (see Figure 2.4) basically follow the same
pattern as the futures contracts, i.e., options expiring in the next December are most
69This can be shown theoretically (see Section 3.3.2) and is confirmed by empirical studies (Uhrig-Homburg
and Wagner 2009; Rittler 2012).
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Figure 2.5.: Yearly trading volumes of EUA futures options on the European Climate
Exchange (ECX) classified by option type and moneyness category. We
call a call (put) option OTM if its moneyness, i.e., the strike price divided
by the underlying futures price, is between 1 and 1.15 (0.85 and 1), deep
OTM if its moneyness is larger (smaller) than 1.15 (0.85), ITM if the mon-
eyness is between 0.85 and 1 (1 and 1.15), and deep ITM if the moneyness
is smaller (larger) than 0.85 (1.15). Volumes are denoted in thousands of
options traded. One EUA futures option allows to enter one EUA futures
contract at expiry.
frequently traded, followed by the later December expiries and other quarterly matu-
rities. In contrast to futures contracts, options expiring in the following compliance
period (2013 or later) are only traded to a very minor degree. Subdividing the option
data into different moneyness categories reveals further insights into the structure of
the option market. As Figure 2.5 shows, (deep) out-of-the-money (OTM) options are
traded much more actively than (deep) in-the-money (ITM) options, which is typical
for option markets in general (see, e.g., Barone-Adesi et al. 2008 for the case of equity
options). Further, we observe that call options are traded more extensively than put
options in the European emissions market.
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3. Equilibrium Price Dynamics of
Emission Permits
3.1. Introduction
In this chapter, we propose a stochastic equilibrium model for emissions markets to
analyze the specific properties of emission permit prices and derive implications for
the most important related derivatives. Our model accounts for all important design
features of current emission trading systems as described in Section 2.2: a sequence of
consecutive compliance periods, allowance of banking and prohibition of borrowing,
penalties for non-compliance, and later delivery of lacking permits. Companies have
stochastic greenhouse gas emissions and choose an optimal trade-off between imple-
menting abatement measures, taking the risk of penalty payments, and trading permits
at equilibrium prices.
Equilibrium models for permit markets are considered under certainty in the envi-
ronmental economics literature, among others by Cronshaw and Kruse (1996), Rubin
(1996), and Schennach (2000). More recently, Seifert et al. (2008) and Carmona et al.
(2009, 2010) develop stochastic models for emission trading schemes of one finite com-
pliance period to characterize equilibrium outcomes and analyze the behavior of permit
prices. Chesney and Taschini (2012) investigate the effects of asymmetric informa-
tion in a similar setting. Different to those models, Kijima et al. (2010) and Cetin and
Verschuere (2009) construct markets with two compliance periods. The general equi-
librium framework of Kijima et al. (2010) allows either both inter-period banking and
borrowing or neither of them, while Cetin and Verschuere (2009) focus on a setting
without inter-period banking. Carmona and Fehr (2011) consider a system of multiple
compliance periods in the context of linking different emission permit markets.
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The next section introduces our model framework. In Section 3.3, we derive equi-
librium outcomes and discuss the price properties of emission permits induced by the
design of the emission trading scheme. Most importantly, we characterize an emission
permit as a strip of European binary options written on economy-wide emissions. In
contrast to classical financial options, the dynamics of this non-tradable underlying is
no longer exogenously given, but derived endogenously through abatement measures.
We exploit this option analogy to derive several general characteristics of emission per-
mit spot and futures prices. Section 3.4 calibrates the model to a setting in accordance
with Phase II of the EU ETS. In this setting, we investigate permit prices, volatili-
ties, and their dependency on abatement measures and future compliance periods. We
further analyze the futures price curve for different emissions scenarios. Finally, a sim-
ulation study based on our model allows us to deduce characteristic properties of the
option-implied volatility smile in emission permit markets.
3.2. Theoretical Model
We consider an economy given by a set of companies I whose greenhouse gas emis-
sions are regulated under a cap-and-trade system with n consecutive compliance pe-
riods [0, T1], [T1, T2], . . . , [Tn−1, Tn]. At time 0, each company i ∈ I receives an
endowment (ei1, . . . , e
i
n) of emission permits for the different periods of the system,
i.e., eik is the initial amount of period-k permits that are valid for compliance in pe-
riod [Tk−1, Tk], with T0 = 0. Companies are obliged to cover the emissions realized
during period k by a sufficient number of period-k permits by the end of the period,
Tk. For enforcement, a penalty of pk is imposed for each ton of exceeding emissions.
In addition, lacking permits have to be delivered in the following compliance period,
effectively reducing the number of period-k + 1 permits. In a similar way, leftover
permits not needed for compliance in period k are banked into the next period, adding
to the amount of period-k + 1 permits. It is not allowed, however, to borrow permits
that are allocated for a future compliance period and use them in the ongoing period.
After [Tn−1, Tn], the last period of the system, left-over permits as well as obligations
to later delivery are forfeited.
Let us consider these rules for a company i whose emissions during the n different
compliance periods are specified by random variables xi0,T1 , x
i
T1,T2
, . . . , xiTn−1,Tn . For
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ease of illustration we first ignore the company’s abatement and trading activities. If i’s
overall emissions during period 1 are larger than ei1, the exceeding (x
i
0,T1
− ei1) tons of
emissions are penalized, and i has to deliver the lacking permits in period 2, decreasing
the number of period-2 permits by the same amount. If, to the contrary, xi0,T1 < e
i
1,
then i banks the leftover period-1 permits into period 2, adding (ei1 − xi0,T1) to the
amount of period-2 permits. In summary, i pays a penalty of p1(xi0,T1 − ei1)+ and
the number of period-2 permits is altered to ei2 + (e
i
1 − xi0,T1).70 Analyzing the same
for period 2, we see that penalties are incurred if xiT1,T2 − (ei2 + ei1 − xi0,T1) > 0.
This can be reinterpreted in the sense that the amount of exceeding emissions at the
end of period 2 is the difference between i’s cumulative emissions from 0 up to T2,
xi0,T2 = x
i
0,T1
+ xiT1,T2 , and the cumulative amount of permits q
i
2 = e
i
1 + e
i
2 that
is allocated for periods 1 and 2. In general terms, the amount of lacking or leftover
permits in period k results as the difference between i’s cumulative emissions up to Tk
and the cumulative allocation qik =
k∑
j=1
eij for all compliance periods up to k, that is
xi0,Tk − qik. For convenience we simply write xTk for x0,Tk throughout the rest of the
thesis. Overall, the present value of the expected penalty imposed on i by the cap-and-
trade system is
E0
{ n∑
j=1
e−rTjpj(xiTj − qij)+
}
, (3.1)
where r is the constant risk-free interest rate and Et {.} denotes the expectation based
on time-t information.
Companies actively manage their risk of paying penalties by trading permits in the mar-
ket and reducing their emissions through emission abatement measures. At each point
in time, a company chooses the amount θik,t of period-k permits it buys or sells in the
market at equilibrium price Sk(t), adjusting its time-t holdings to eik +
∫ t
0
θik,sds. In-
corporating the trading strategy alters the expected penalty payment (3.1) by replacing
qik with Q
i
k =
k∑
j=1
(
eij +
∫ Tj
0
θij,sds
)
.
In the same way, the company decides about the operative abatement measures ξit it
implements at t to reduce its instantaneous emissions. Without abatement, i’s emis-
sions are driven by two components: A persistent business-as-usual emission rate yi
70Throughout this thesis, we write z+ for max{0, z}.
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following the Itoˆ process
yit = y
i
0 +
∫ t
0
µiy(s)ds+
∫ t
0
σiy(s)dZ
i
s (3.2)
with time-dependent drift µiy(t) and volatility σ
i
y(t) > 0, and short-term emission
shocks ni given by
nit = σ
i
εε
i
t (3.3)
with σiε > 0. Z
i is a standard Wiener process and εi is a standard Gaussian white noise
process, and we assume that the increments ofW it =
∫ t
0
εisds andZ
i
t are uncorrelated.
71
While yi captures deterministic patterns of the emission rate like seasonalities as well
as fluctuations that are permanent in nature, ni represents temporary shocks like the
outage of a carbon-friendly production unit that is instantaneously replaced by a more
polluting one. Reduced by operative abatement ξit , i’s instantaneous emission rate is
yit + n
i
t − ξit , and its cumulative emissions up to time t result as
xit =
∫ t
0
(yis + n
i
s − ξis)ds. (3.4)
Abating at an instantaneous rate of ξit costsC
i(ξit), whereC
i is a differentiable and con-
vex abatement cost function, as motivated by detailed bottom-up studies (e.g., Klepper
and Peterson 2006; Naucle´r and Enkvist 2009) which point out that marginal abatement
costs increase at least linearly.72
Given these ingredients, each company maximizes its utility by finding an optimal
trade-off between implementing abatement measures, trading permits in the market,
and taking the risk of penalty payments. Under risk-neutrality,73 the company mini-
71We also assume that the increments ofW it and Z
j
t are uncorrelated across companies, i.e., for all i, j ∈ I .
72Note that Ci stands for the costs of operative abatement ξi, not for investments into carbon-friendly
technologies. Carbon-related investments do not change the instantaneous emission rate, but lead to
a flatter operative abatement cost function Ci in the future, similar to general technological progress.
Simple models for technological progress resulting in deterministically time-dependent abatement cost
functions do not change our results. For optimal investment policies in the context of emission trading
systems we refer to Taschini (2008) and the references therein.
73The effects of risk aversion on the price dynamics of emission permits are analyzed by Seifert et al. (2008)
within a framework of one single compliance period.
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mizes overall costs by solving the optimization problem
min
(θi,ξi)
E0
{∫ Tn
0
e−rtCi(ξit)dt+
n∑
j=1
∫ Tj
0
e−rtSj(t)θij,tdt+
n∑
j=1
e−rTjpj(xiTj −Qij)+
}
(3.5)
with optimal trading strategy θi = (θi1, . . . , θ
i
n), θ
i
k = (θ
i
k,t)t∈[0,Tk] and abatement
strategy ξi = (ξit)t∈[0,Tn]. The first term of (3.5) represents the costs for implementing
abatement measures and the second term describes the costs of i’s trading strategy.
The last term incorporates possible penalties at the end of each compliance period in
accordance with (3.1).
3.3. Emissions Market Equilibrium
We solve the model for equilibrium permit prices that clear the market when all com-
panies i ∈ I choose optimal trading and abatement strategies according to (3.5). To
begin with, we apply the stochastic maximum principle in conjunction with dynamic
programming (see Appendix A.1) to characterize the optimal trading and abatement
strategy of a company for given permit prices S1, . . . , Sn.
Proposition 1 (Optimality Conditions) For an optimal trading and abatement strat-
egy (θi, ξi), a company’s instantaneous marginal abatement costs are equal to the per-
mit price of the ongoing compliance period,
∂Ci
∂ξi
(ξit) = Sk(t), t ∈ [Tk−1, Tk]. (3.6)
Further, the present value of a company’s expected overall penalty for an additional
ton of emissions in period k is equal to the price of period-k emission permits, k =
1, . . . , n, that is74
n∑
j=k
e−r(Tj−t)Pt
{
xiTj > Q
i
j
}
pj = Sk(t), t ∈ [0, Tk]. (3.7)
74Pt {.} denotes the probability conditional on time-t information.
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The first condition arises due to the fact that companies can achieve compliance equally
by abating emissions or by buying additional permits in the market. Both actions re-
duce the number of uncovered emissions at the end of the ongoing compliance period.
Consequently, the marginal cost of both actions is equal for an optimal strategy, since
otherwise a company could improve by abating more emissions and buying less per-
mits, or vice versa. This result is central to deterministic models for cap-and-trade sys-
tems developed in the environmental economics literature (e.g., Cronshaw and Kruse
1996; Rubin 1996).75
The second condition characterizes the marginal value of an emission permit for an in-
dividual company, which is induced by the system’s penalty mechanism and the rules
on banking, borrowing, and later delivery. If a company is short of permits for a par-
ticular compliance period k, then an additional permit saves a penalty payment and
additionally also reduces the number of permits to be delivered later, which effectively
increases the amount of permits in the next compliance period. In case of a permit sur-
plus, an additional permit does not avoid any penalty payment, but it can be banked and
adds to the available amount of permits in the following compliance period as well. The
same logic applies for the following compliance periods again. Overall, the marginal
value of a period-k emission permit equals the sum of penalties for period k and all
following compliance periods weighted by the probability that penalties arise. For an
optimal strategy, this marginal value is equal to the permit price Sk.76
3.3.1. Permit Prices
Proposition 1 implies that in equilibrium, marginal abatement costs as well as the prob-
ability of penalties to accrue are equalized over all companies in the economy, in line
with the emissions market mechanism first formalized by Montgomery (1972). In a sit-
uation where marginal abatement costs differ across companies, companies with lower
marginal abatement costs extend their abatement activities and sell emission permits
to companies with higher abatement costs, enabling them to cut back their abatement
75This result is also shown within stochastic equilibrium models for one compliance period in the literature,
see for example Seifert et al. (2008) and Carmona et al. (2009, 2010). In the context of multiple compli-
ance periods, it is important to note that marginal abatement costs are equal to the permit price for the
period in which the abatement is actually realized, which is the ongoing period in our case.
76For the special case of one single compliance period (n = 1), this result and the following Proposition 2
are shown by Carmona et al. (2009, 2010) in a discrete-time model.
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actions. If they agree on a permit price between their respective marginal abatement
costs, both companies are able to profit from these actions, implying that such situa-
tion cannot persist in equilibrium. In the same way, the market is not in equilibrium
if some companies have uncovered emissions at the end of a compliance period Tk
while others have remaining permits. Taking a global point of view, this condition
implies that one and thus every company’s emissions exceed their permit holdings ex-
actly when economy-wide cumulative emissions xTk =
∑
i∈I
xiTk exceed economy-wide
permit holdings Qk =
∑
i∈I
Qik. Since the market clearing condition holds in equilib-
rium, individual trading strategies cancel out in Qk and we have Qk = qk =
∑
i∈I
qik.
Altogether, the following result arises from condition (3.7).
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium Permit Prices) In equilibrium, the price of a period-k
emission permit is given by
Sk(t) =
n∑
j=k
e−r(Tj−t)Pt
{
xTj > qj
}
pj (3.8)
for t ∈ [0, Tk]. That is, an emission permit is a strip of European binary call options
written on cumulative economy-wide emissions.
This proposition characterizes emission permits created in the context of environmental
trading schemes as a financial derivative. The price of an emission permit consists of
one value component for each compliance period of the system representing the prob-
ability that penalties accrue for that period because the economy is short of emission
permits. At the end of the period, Tk, this value is equal to the penalty for exceeding
emissions in that period if cumulative emissions xTk exceed the cumulative allocation
qk, and zero otherwise. Thus it has a payoff function that is identical to a European
binary call option with maturity Tk and strike qk, written on the cumulative emissions
xt =
∑
i∈I
xit of the whole economy. The dynamics of this non-tradable underlying is
given by
dxt = (yt − ξt)dt+ σεdWt (3.9)
in our framework, where yt =
∑
i∈I
yit is the economy-wide business-as-usual emission
rate following
dyt = µy(t)dt+ σy(t)dZt (3.10)
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and ξt =
∑
i∈I
ξit is economy-wide abatement. The parameter σε as well as the func-
tions µy(t) and σy(t) result from aggregating the individual emissions processes (3.2),
(3.3), and (3.4) such that Wt and Zt are standard Wiener processes with uncorrelated
increments. A distinctive feature of economy-wide emissions xt as a non-tradable un-
derlying is that market participants can and obviously do influence its state through their
abatement actions ξt. Since abatement reduces the companies’ greenhouse gas emis-
sions, an emission permit is worth less than the corresponding strip of binary options in
a scenario where no abatement is possible.
The specific form of permit prices revealed by Proposition 2 obviously affects their
precise distributional properties,77 but finds also expression in major structural features.
First, there is a time-dependent upper bound for emission permit prices,
Sk(t) ≤
n∑
j=k
e−r(Tj−t)pj , (3.11)
corresponding to a scenario of permit shortage for all compliance periods. In such a
situation, one permit less means an additional penalty in the current and also in all fol-
lowing compliance periods due to the later delivery rule. This upper bound of emission
permit prices obviously depends on the number of compliance periods in the system.
Furthermore, the single value components of an emission permit are pulled to one of the
two values — zero or the penalty — by the end of the corresponding compliance period.
This effect is weak as long as the period end is far and the uncertainty about penalties
to accrue is high, such that medium values are attained with significant probabilities.
As uncertainty decreases, the convergence to one of the two possible values becomes
stronger. As a direct consequence, the prices of period-k and period-k + 1 permits are
either identical at the end of period k, or differ by the amount of the penalty, that is
Sk(Tk)− Sk+1(Tk) = 1{xTk>qk}pk. (3.12)
This means that there is a smooth transition when period-k permits are converted into
period-k + 1 permits by banking if the economy is in permit surplus. In contrast, if the
77In Chapter 4, we show that reduced-form model variants derived from our equilibrium model are indeed
better suited to capture the empirical properties of emission permit prices and related derivatives than
standard models for asset price dynamics.
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economy is short of permits, prices decrease by the penalty similar to the drop in value
of a coupon bond after a coupon payment date.
Understanding an emission permit as a strip of binary options also sheds light on the
volatility structure of permit prices. Given the dynamics (3.9) and (3.10) of cumulative
emissions and the prevailing emission rate, we obtain local volatilities by applying Itoˆ’s
Lemma.
Proposition 3 (Local Volatility) Relative local volatility of emission permit prices, as
given by
σSk =
√(
∂Sk
∂x σε
)2
+
(
∂Sk
∂y σy
)2
Sk
, (3.13)
is state- and time-dependent.
Due to the binary options characteristics of emission permits, the volatility of the single
value components Sk − Sk+1 clearly depends on the time to the end of the compliance
period, Tk, and is almost surely zero at the end of the period.78 The state-dependency
becomes most evident when comparing scenarios of extremely high and medium emis-
sions. In the first case, prices are close to the upper bound (3.11) and absolute volatility
(that is, the numerator of (3.13)) is almost zero, since a marginal change in cumulative
emissions or the prevailing emission rate hardly changes the probability of penalties.
On the other hand, relative volatility is clearly higher in a scenario of medium emis-
sions, since absolute volatility is positive and prices are far away from the upper bound.
For very low emissions, however, we do not get a clear indication for the volatility
behavior, since absolute volatilities go to zero, but prices approach zero as well. We
shed light on this aspect by considering the detailed volatility structure for a calibrated
setting in Section 3.4.1.
3.3.2. Futures
It is market convention to consider the emission permits of the actual ongoing compli-
ance period as spot permits, such that spot permits are period-1 permits until the end of
78Since σε > 0, Section 3.3 of Carmona et al. (2013) applies to our model, which implies that the cumulative
emissions exactly hit the cap with zero probability, Pt
{
xTk = qk
}
= 0.
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compliance period 1, then period-2 permits until T2, and so on. This view makes prac-
tical sense because only period-1 permits are usable for compliance in period 1, and
are converted into period-2 permits by banking at the end of the period. In accordance
with that, permit futures deliver spot permits at maturity. While a futures contract with
maturity t ∈ [0, T1) delivers a period-1 permit, futures maturing at t ∈ (T1, T2) deliver
period-2 permits. Based on this convention, we characterize the futures price curve in
emission permit markets and discuss the applicability of classical convenience yield
models.
Consider an intra-period futures contract at t ∈ [0, T1) with maturity t ∈ [t, T1). Since
period-1 permits cannot be used for compliance before T1, they are pure investment
assets before that date, and the storability of permits directly implies the standard cost-
of-carry relation
F (t, t) = er(t−t)S1(t), (3.14)
where F (t, t) is the futures price.
To the contrary, this does not apply to inter-period futures, i.e., the case t ∈ [0, T1),
t ∈ (T1, T2). The futures contract delivers a period-2 permit, which can obviously not
be used for compliance in period 1, while holding the spot (period-1) permits provides
the option to use them at the end of period 1. This additional benefit can be quantified by
the difference between period-1 and period-2 permit prices according to (3.8) together
with (3.14):
F (t, t) = er(t−t)S1(t)− er(t−T1)Pt {xT1 > q1} p1. (3.15)
Consequently, the backwardation of inter-period futures defined as the difference be-
tween the current spot price and the discounted futures price, B(t, t) = S1(t) −
e−r(t−t)F (t, t), is determined by the probability of permit shortage at the end of the
ongoing compliance period. We summarize the implications of (3.14) and (3.15).79
Proposition 4 (Futures Price Curve) The futures price curve has the following prop-
erties for all t ∈ [0, T1):
a) Futures are in contango within the compliance period, i.e., for t ∈ [t, T1).
79In line with Litzenberger and Rabinowitz (1995), futures with maturity t are in contango ifB(t, t) ≤ 0 and
in (weak) backwardation if the futures price is lower than the compounded spot price, i.e., B(t, t) > 0.
Strong backwardation means that the futures price is lower than the current spot price.
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b) The backwardation of futures with maturity in the following compliance period,
i.e., t ∈ (T1, T2), is given by
B(t, t) = e−r(T1−t)Pt {xT1 > q1} p1. (3.16)
In particular, inter-period futures are in contango if the probability of permit
shortage at the end of the ongoing compliance period is 0, in weak backwardation
if it is positive, and in strong backwardation if it is above
(er(T1−t) − e−r(t−T1))S1(t)p1 .
This proposition provides a direct link to the classical commodity literature. Holding
the spot asset endows the owner with an embedded usage and timing option as elab-
orated by Routledge et al. (2000) and Jarrow (2010), among others. However, while
for classical commodities any point in time comes into question for exercising this us-
age option, emission permits can only be consumed at the end of a compliance period.
Thus, this option is worthless within a compliance period and holding the spot permit
has no advantage compared to futures maturing in the same period. To the contrary,
the usage option becomes relevant if the futures’ maturity is in the next compliance
period. If the economy is short of permits, the option is exercised to save penalty pay-
ments. Otherwise, it is not exercised for a number of leftover permits which are banked
into the next period. Consequently, inter-period futures are in weak backwardation if
the probability of permit shortage at the end of the compliance period is not exactly
zero.
Since the seminal work of Brennan (1958), it is common to express the benefit of hold-
ing the spot asset rather than a futures contract as a convenience yield. In general,
a time-dependent stochastic instantaneous convenience yield δt changes the standard
cost-of-carry relation to
F (t, t) = Et
{
er(t−t)−
∫ t
t
δsds
}
S1(t). (3.17)
For given t ∈ [0, T1) we define Dt(t) :=
∫ t
t
δsds as the convenience yield from t to t.
From (3.14) and (3.15) we can easily derive necessary properties of Dt.
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Proposition 5 (Convenience Yields) The cumulative convenience yield Dt fulfills
a) Dt(t) = 0 for intra-period futures, i.e., t ∈ [t, T1), and
b) Et
{
e−Dt(t)
}
= 1− e
−r(T1−t)Pt{xT1>q1}p1
S1(t)
for inter-period futures, i.e.,
t ∈ (T1, T2).
It is obvious that Dt has to “jump” in T1 in order to fulfill the conditions of Propo-
sition 5. Therefore it is not possible to define an instantaneous convenience yield δt
in such way that Dt has these properties. In particular, standard models like a mean-
reverting stochastic convenience yield or a simple AR(4) process as used by Daskalakis
et al. (2009) and Chevallier (2009) for inter-period futures do not satisfy Proposition 5.
These models inevitably lead to relative mispricing when futures of two or more differ-
ent maturities are considered.
3.3.3. Calculating Equilibrium Prices
We provide a strategy to calculate equilibrium permit prices as the solution of a system
of partial differential equations (PDEs). Permit prices are determined by cumulative
economy-wide emissions according to (3.8), but it is not simply possible to evaluate
the expectation since this non-tradable underlying is influenced through endogenously
derived abatement measures. More specifically, economy-wide abatement ξt results as
the sum of the companies’ abatement strategies that solve the individual optimization
problems (3.5). Appendix A.2 shows that we can simplify the problem by optimizing
economy-wide abatement directly with respect to an aggregate problem.
Proposition 6 (Global Problem) Assume that economy-wide emissions xt still follow
the dynamics (3.9), but let aggregate abatement ξt be the solution of the global problem
min
ξ
E0
{∫ Tn
0
e−rtC(ξt)dt+
n∑
j=1
e−rTjpj(xTj − qj)+
}
, (3.18)
where C is the aggregate abatement cost function of the economy. Then, S1, . . . , Sn
defined by equation (3.8) are equilibrium permit price processes. Further, the permit
price of the ongoing compliance period is equal to the instantaneous marginal abate-
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ment costs of the economy,
Sk(t) =
∂C
∂ξ
(ξt), t ∈ [Tk−1, Tk]. (3.19)
In light of this result, we determine the optimal abatement strategy of the aggregate
problem (3.18). We follow a backward induction approach, starting at the last com-
pliance period [Tn−1, Tn] and proceeding to the periods [Tn−2, Tn−1], . . . , [0, T1]. For
each compliance period k, we include the period k + 1 solution into the terminal con-
dition and settle the problem by dynamic programming. We state the resulting system
of PDEs in here for a quadratic abatement cost function
C(ξt) =
1
2
γξ2t (3.20)
with cost coefficient γ, and economy-wide business-as-usual emissions following an
arithmetic Brownian motion
dyt = µydt+ σydZt, (3.21)
and refer to Appendix A.3 for the derivation in the general case.
Proposition 7 (PDEs) For the global problem (3.18), optimal abatement ξt at time
t ∈ [Tk−1, Tk] is given by
ξt =
1
γ
er(t−Tk−1)
∂Vk
∂x
(t, xt, yt), (3.22)
where Vk is the time-Tk−1 expected value of an optimal strategy starting at Tk−1. Vk
solves the characteristic PDE
∂Vk
∂t
= −yt ∂Vk
∂x
+
1
2γ
er(t−Tk−1)
(
∂Vk
∂x
)2
− ∂Vk
∂y
µy− 1
2
∂2Vk
∂x2
σ2ε−
1
2
∂2Vk
∂y2
σ2y (3.23)
with boundary condition
Vk(Tk, xTk , yTk) = e
−r(Tk−Tk−1)(pk(xTk − qk)+ + Vk+1(Tk, xTk , yTk)) (3.24)
and Vn+1 = 0.
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As shown by Proposition 6, the solution for optimal economy-wide abatement at time t
directly implies the equilibrium permit price of the ongoing compliance period through
(3.19). Thus, permit prices can be computed by numerically solving the system of
PDEs (3.23), (3.24), starting from period n and proceeding backwards.
3.4. Calibration
We calibrate our model to a setting in line with Phase II of the EU ETS as outlined in
Section 2.3. Phase II from 2008 to 2012 is followed by periods of eight years length
from 2013 onwards. Figures for permit allocations are reported by MEMO/08/796
of the European Commission, with the total number of permits declining in a linear
manner.80 Penalties are 100 Euros per ton of exceeding emissions in Phase II and
increase “in accordance with the European index of consumer prices” (see Directive
2009/29/EC), which we assume to be 2.5% per year. The estimation of parameters
describing the business-as-usual emissions of the economy is not straightforward. The
European Commission officially reports data on emissions within the EU ETS since
2005, but these figures may potentially be biased by the introduction of the scheme
itself. On the other hand, the European Environment Agency (EEA) reports data on
the total amount of greenhouse gas emissions of the 27 EU member states including
all industry sectors except LULUCF activities also before 2005.81 Apart from the fact
that the scope is much larger, this data is considered as a good proxy for emissions
within the EU ETS (Ellerman and Buchner 2008). We adjust for the different scope
by scaling the EEA data according to the ratio of emissions within the EU ETS and
within the EEA data obtained for the years after 2005. We then calculate the mean
and standard deviation of the absolute yearly emission changes of the scaled EEA data
from 1995 to 2004. The mean of 0.8 is the drift of the business-as-usual emission rate
(3.21), and we assume that the standard deviation of 30 is largely due to permanent
shocks of the business-as-usual emission rate, while temporary shocks only cause a
small fraction of it. Therefore we set σy to 28 and σε to 2. Further, linear interpolation
of Europe’s marginal abatement cost curve reported by Naucle´r and Enkvist (2009) and
80The amount of permits to be allocated in Phase III was updated by Decision 2010/634/EU of the European
Commission. Since Decision 2010/634/EU does not specify updated figures for the other compliance
periods, however, we still base our calibration on the information provided by MEMO/08/796.
81The EEA aggregates emissions data reported by the countries, publishes it on their website
http://www.eea.europa.eu, and forwards it to the UNFCCC.
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Table 3.1.: Summary of parameter values for a setting in accordance with Phase II of
the EU ETS. The allocation and penalties for four compliance periods from
2008 to 2012, 2013 to 2020, 2021 to 2028, and 2029 to 2036 are chosen as
outlined by MEMO/08/796 of the European Commission. Parameters for
the emissions processes (3.9) and (3.21) are inferred from data provided by
the EEA. We consider a scenario of low abatement costs (with coefficient
γ1) compared to the case of higher costs (γ2). r is the constant risk-free
interest rate.
Parameter Compliance Period k
1 2 3 4
End of compliance period Tk 5 13 21 29
Allocation (Million permits) ek 10,400 14,800 12,500 10,100
Penalty (Euro) pk 100 122 149 182
Drift of emission rate µy 0.8
Volatility of emission rate σy 28
Volatility of emission shocks σε 2
Abatement cost coefficient (low) γ1 0.1
Abatement cost coefficient (high) γ2 0.2
Interest rate (p.a.) r 0.04
Cline (2011) suggests the abatement cost coefficient of (3.20) to be in the region of 0.1
to 0.2. We consider two different scenarios, γ1 = 0.1 and γ2 = 0.2, to analyze the
impact of abatement measures. Finally, we set the constant risk-free interest rate r to
4%. All parameters are summarized in Table 3.1.
3.4.1. Prices and Volatilities
For the specified EU ETS setting, we investigate the behavior of permit prices and
volatilities over time as well as the role of abatement actions and subsequent com-
pliance periods. Figure 3.1 illustrates permit prices S1 dependent on economy-wide
cumulative realized emissions xt and the prevailing business-as-usual emission rate yt,
calculated according to Proposition 7. We consider three different points in time within
the compliance period [0, T1], and compare on the one hand the two abatement scenar-
ios with cost coefficients γ1 = 0.1 and γ2 = 0.2, and on the other hand a setting that
takes only the first two compliance periods into account to a full four-period setting.
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Two Periods
t = 1.5
t = 3
t = 4.9
Figure 3.1.: Permit price S1 dependent on cumulative realized emissions xt and the
prevailing business-as-usual emission rate yt. We consider a two-period
and a four-period setting in line with the EU ETS and consider in each case
three different time points within the first compliance period: one and a
half (t = 1.5) and three years (t = 3) after the compliance period’s start
and shortly before the period’s end (t = 4.9). The green plots represent
the high abatement cost scenario, the blue plots the case of low abatement
costs. Parameter values are chosen according to Table 3.1.
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Four Periods
t = 1.5
t = 3
t = 4.9
Figure 3.1 (continued).
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It is eye-catching how the binary character of emission permit prices becomes visible
when approaching the end of the compliance period. While at the beginning of the
period, the permit price has a rather unremarkable shape and increases almost linearly
in the level of emissions, the picture is dominated by the two states of permit shortage
or surplus right before the end of the period. The part of the permit price beyond this
binary component is attributable to the following compliance periods and thus naturally
larger for the four-period setting. Comparing the two different abatement scenarios, we
see that lower abatement costs lead to lower permit prices. This reflects the equilibrium
mechanism in this market: Since discounted expected penalties, marginal abatement
costs, and permit prices are equal in equilibrium, lower abatement costs lead to lower
permit prices and an increased amount of abatement actions, which reduces the prob-
ability of penalties. The impact of abatement measures becomes smaller, however, for
very low or very high emissions, when the amount of abatement is less crucial for
penalties to accrue or not.
Figure 3.2 shows volatilities σS1 for the two- and four-period setting for the case of
low abatement costs. Since the level and shape of the volatility surface for high abate-
ment costs is very similar, we refrain from displaying it. The plots clearly reveal the
state- and time-dependent nature of local volatilities pointed out by Proposition 3. As
established before, volatility goes to zero for very high levels of cumulative emissions
or the prevailing business-as-usual emission rate. To the contrary, volatility is highest
for very low emissions. Low prices that are still sensitive towards changes in emission
levels lead to high relative volatilities. It follows that volatilities are overall negatively
related to emission permit prices. The binary component of permit prices is also re-
flected by the volatility surface. At the period end, relative volatility is much higher for
non-penalty states, for which permit prices are low.
A comparison of the setting with two compliance periods to the four-period setting
shows that the volatility is considerably lower in the latter case, especially for low emis-
sion levels. The main reason is that the price components attributable to the compliance
periods in the remote future react less sensitively to changes in today’s cumulative re-
alized emissions or the prevailing emission rate. Furthermore, the tightening allocation
in later compliance periods leads to higher values, and thus lower volatilities, for these
value components. Accordingly, the value components coming from additional com-
pliance periods weaken the high relative volatility from the current period and cause
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Two Periods
t = 1.5
t = 3
t = 4.9
Figure 3.2.: Relative local volatility σS1 according to (3.13), dependent on cumulative
realized emissions xt and the prevailing business-as-usual emission rate
yt. We consider a two-period and a four-period setting in line with the EU
ETS and consider in each case three different time points within the first
compliance period: one and a half (t = 1.5) and three years (t = 3) after
the compliance period’s start and shortly before the period’s end (t = 4.9).
Parameter values are chosen according to Table 3.1.
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Four Periods
t = 1.5
t = 3
t = 4.9
Figure 3.2 (continued).
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a smoothing effect. This is desired by policy makers because stable prices increase
the confidence to the trading system and tend to trigger early investment into carbon-
friendly technologies.82
We exemplarily apply our model to calculate theoretical permit prices for the beginning
of 2011, i.e., t = 3, based on economy-wide cumulative realized emissions x3 and the
prevailing business-as-usual emission rate y3. Realized emissions are officially pub-
lished by the EU Commission every year83 and were 2,060, 1,873, and 1,932 million
tons for the years 2008, 2009, and 2010. As the sum of these figures we obtain cumu-
lative realized emissions of x3 = 5,865. It is more challenging to infer the prevailing
business-as-usual emission rate y3 of the economy since the best data available is the
amount of realized emissions x2,3 during 2010, which is composed of economy-wide
business-as-usual emissions and short-term shocks reduced by abatement in line with
(3.4), i.e.,84
x2,3 =
∫ 3
2
(ys + ns − ξs)ds = 1,932. (3.25)
We first adjust for the abatement realized by the economy in 2010,
∫ 3
2
ξsds. Unfor-
tunately there is little fundamental data available, and most related studies quantify
economy-wide abatement by an econometric analysis of emission projections and re-
alized emissions, focussing on Phase I of the EU ETS from 2005 to 2007.85 We thus
take a simplistic approach based on the result that the prevailing permit spot price is
equal to the marginal abatement costs of the economy, which means ξt = S1(t)/γ,
γ ∈ {γ1, γ2} according to (3.19) with the quadratic abatement cost function (3.20).
Therefore the average permit price in 2010, 14.34 Euros,86 divided by γ provides an es-
timate of economy-wide abatement
∫ 3
2
ξsds, which results to 143.4 million tons in 2010
for the low and 71.7 million tons for the high abatement cost scenario. Given (3.25),
the resulting estimate for
∫ 3
2
(ys +ns)ds is 2,075.4 for the low and 2,003.7 for the high
abatement cost scenario. We finally infer the prevailing business-as-usual emission rate
82It is widely known from the real options literature (e.g., Pindyck 1988) that price uncertainty increases the
value of the option to delay investment, while stable prices lead to early investment.
83Chapter 5 provides further information on the publication of realized emissions by the EU Commission.
84In accordance with the other economy-wide variables previously defined, it is nt =
∑
i∈I
nit.
85See Laing et al. (2013) for an overview of related studies, especially Table 1. As an example, Ellerman
and Buchner (2008) come to the conclusion that abatement in 2005 and 2006 was “probably between 50
and 100 million” tons of carbon dioxide per year.
86Spot market prices of emission permits traded within the EU ETS are provided by BlueNext.
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y3 by matching the first moments according to the conditions∫ 3
2
(ys + ns)ds = E2
{∫ 3
2
(ys + ns)ds
}
and y3 = E2 {y3} , (3.26)
which yields87
y3 =
∫ 3
2
(ys + ns)ds+
1
2
µy. (3.27)
Accordingly we have after rounding y3 = 2,076 for the low and y3 = 2,004 for the
high abatement cost scenario. The inferred business-as-usual emission rate y3 is in
both abatement cost scenarios below the average allocation of 2,080 permits per year
in Phase II. These low emission levels are a consequence of the economic downturn
caused by the recent financial crisis, and lead to a large surplus of emission permits in
the current EU ETS.
Based on the economy-wide realized emissions x3 and the prevailing emission rate y3
we calculate theoretical permit prices within our calibrated model. The low emission
levels naturally translate to prices that are at the lower end of the possible price range
illustrated by Figure 3.1. In particular, we obtain a permit price of 26.90 (45.41) Euros
in the four-period setting with low (high) abatement costs, and 12.81 (14.25) Euros in
the two-period setting with low (high) abatement costs. Comparing these model prices
to spot market prices of emission permits in 2011, which were on average 13.02 Euros,
suggests that considering the EU ETS as a system of four periods leads to an overpric-
ing of emission permit prices, while the prices resulting from a two-period setting are
reasonably close to market prices. This observation might be interpreted as evidence
that market participants in the EU ETS price the compliance periods after 2020 only to
a very minor degree, such that they basically incorporate only two compliance periods
(Phase II and Phase III) into emission permit prices. It is not unlikely that a two-period
setting is indeed best suited to approximate the current situation of the EU ETS for
at least two reasons. First, compliance periods starting in the remote future (in 2021
or later) are generally associated with high political uncertainty. This political uncer-
tainty is fueled by the large permit surplus in the EU ETS and corresponding low permit
87Note that for the dynamics of yt given by (3.21) and the definition of nt, we have
E2
{∫ 3
2
(ys + ns)ds
}
+
1
2
µy =
∫ 3
2
(y2 + µy(s− 2))ds+ 1
2
µy = y2 + µy = E2 {y3} .
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prices, raising doubts on the effectiveness of the EU ETS as an environmental policy
instrument. In an extreme scenario, the EU ETS could completely lose political sup-
port by 2020 and would not be continued, such that all emission permits would become
worthless. Second, one possibility to tackle the prevailing permit surplus in the EU ETS
on the long run is to restrict banking at the end of Phase III to a certain extent, since it is
often criticized that unlimited banking accumulates an over-allocation over compliance
periods (see Grubb 2012). In this case, however, many permits would become worth-
less at the end of Phase III as well, such that following periods after 2020 do not lead
to a value component in today’s permits. Overall, our calibrated model suggests that
complete political certainty about the conditions outlined by the EU Commission until
2036 would lead to an additional value component of 14.09 (31.16) Euros in today’s
emission permit prices in the low (high) abatement cost scenario, which is currently
incorporated only to a small extent due to the reasons mentioned.
3.4.2. Futures Price Curve
We further illustrate the permit futures price curve for different emissions scenarios
within our calibrated two-period setting with low abatement costs. At t = 3, we fix
a medium emissions scenario at realized emissions of x3 = 6,900 and a prevailing
business-as-usual emission rate of y3 = 2,442. For both x3 and y3, the low (high)
emissions scenario is 15% below (above) these values, such that the low/low scenario
exactly corresponds to the state x3 = 5,865, y3 = 2,076 of the EU ETS documented in
the last section. Table 3.2 summarizes the emissions scenarios considered.
Table 3.2.: Emissions scenarios at t = 3 in terms of economy-wide cumulative emis-
sions x3 and the prevailing business-as-usual emission rate y3. A scenario
of medium emissions is fixed at x3 = 6,900 and y3 = 2,442, and the low
(high) emissions scenario is 15% below (above) these values.
Scenario (t = 3) Cumulative Emissions x3 Prevailing Emission Rate y3
low/low 5,865 2,076
low/high 5,865 2,808
medium/medium 6,900 2,442
high/low 7,935 2,076
high/high 7,935 2,808
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Figure 3.3.: Futures price curves (futures prices F (t, t) dependent on maturity t) at
t = 3 within a two-period EU ETS setting. We consider different sce-
narios of realized cumulative emissions x3 and the prevailing business-as-
usual emission rate y3 as stated in Table 3.2: is the scenario of high
realized emissions and a high prevailing emission rate (high/high), is
the low/high scenario, is medium/medium, is high/low, and is the
low/low scenario. The dashed vertical lines mark the end of the first and of
the second compliance period. Parameter values are chosen according to
Table 3.1.
Figure 3.3 depicts futures price curves for the different scenarios as calculated from our
model.88 As stated by Proposition 4, futures are in contango within a compliance pe-
riod, in line with the standard cost-of-carry relationship. To the contrary, the end of the
compliance period leads to backwardation for inter-period futures. The plots illustrate
that this backwardation is strongest for high realized emissions. In such a scenario,
the probability of permit shortage at the end of the ongoing compliance period is high,
and the current emission permits can be used to avoid penalty payments. This is not
possible, however, with a futures contract delivering a permit for the next compliance
period, inducing the backwardation. As opposed to this, inter-period futures are only
88The price of futures maturing in period k ∈ {1, 2} is calculated based on the price of period-k permits and
the cost-of-carry relationship within compliance periods, see (3.14). Since Proposition 7 yields a PDE
solution only for permit spot prices, we calculate the price of period-2 permits by Monte-Carlo simulation
based on (3.8). For this and all other Monte-Carlo simulations documented in this thesis, we discretize
processes to 260 trading days per year and simulate 10,000 price paths.
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marginally backwardated when emissions are very low and there is an expected surplus
of permits for the ongoing compliance period. In this case, almost the whole value of
an emission permit is attributable to the following compliance periods. While the prob-
ability of penalties to accrue for the ongoing period is almost zero, it is much greater
for the following compliance periods due to tightened allocations and the uncertainty
driving the emissions process. Such a scenario is comparable to the situation of the EU
ETS in the last years of Phase II. Our model predicts that in this case the whole futures
price curve is almost in contango, since an additional Phase II permit will be banked
and converted to a Phase III permit with a very high probability.
3.4.3. Characteristics of Volatility Smiles
Besides futures contracts, the most important exchange-traded derivatives in the context
of emission trading systems are European options, written on emission permit futures
with the same maturity date.89 As nonlinear derivatives, option prices depend on the
whole probability distribution of permit prices. Our aim is to characterize the volatility
smile shapes of European carbon options within our equilibrium model. Since carbon
options are written on a strip of European binary call options according to Proposi-
tion 2, the pricing problem is structurally similar to compound options first studied by
Geske (1979). As revealed in Section 3.4.1, local volatilities of emission permits are
generally negatively related to prices, suggesting a downward-sloping volatility smile
in this market. The shape of the smile is, however, not immediately implied by local
volatilities since it is also affected by the time-dependent volatility behavior until the
option’s expiry.
In our risk-neutral setting the price of a European call option with strikeK and maturity
t written on emission permit futures with the same maturity is given by
C(t, t,K) = e−r(t−t)Et
{(
F (t, t)−K)+} . (3.28)
We calculate call option prices for several emission level scenarios within the chosen
setting of two compliance periods and low abatement costs by simulating the probabil-
ity distributions of permit prices. The related Black (1976) implied volatility at strike
89We abstract from the fact that there are usually a few days between the option’s expiry and the maturity
date of the futures contract.
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K is denoted by IV (K) and we write IVATM for IV (F (t, t)). To capture the shape of
volatility smiles, we follow Ederington and Guan (2013): We calculate implied volatil-
ities for nine strikes above and nine strikes below F (t, t), given by
Kj := F (t, t)(1 +
1
10
jIVATM
√
t− t) (3.29)
with j ∈ {−9, . . . , 9}. The range of strike prices relevant for market participants de-
pends on the underlying’s volatility until the option’s expiry date, which is accounted
for by this choice. Then we standardize implied volatilities according to SIVj =
IV (Kj)
IVATM
. By regressing SIVj on j100 for j ∈ {−9, . . . , 0}, we obtain the slope of
the smile for strikes below F (t, t), denoted by LS. Doing the same for j ∈ {0, . . . , 9},
we get HS, the slope of the smile for strikes above F (t, t). Based on this procedure,
we obtain two figures LS and HS describing the slope of the volatility smile. If LS
is negative and HS positive, implied volatilities decrease in the strike price for strikes
below F (t, t), and increase for strikes above F (t, t), a pattern which we call smile-
shaped. If both LS and HS are negative, implied volatilities are generally decreasing
in the strike price and the smile is downward-sloping. The other two combinations for
LS and HS are interpreted analogously.
The results for different scenarios and time parameters are stated by Table 3.3. It is
eye-catching that the volatility smile is downward-sloping for the vast majority of emis-
sions scenarios. In fact, both LS and HS are negative for 136 of the 150 scenarios.
Further, the downward-slope of the volatility smile is strongest for scenarios of very
low emissions. These results accord to the negative relation of emission permit prices
and volatilities and reveal how this behavior translates to option prices. Still, other
shapes are also possible, since the single binary options can add up to various shapes
of the price probability distributions, depending on time, emission levels, and maturity.
In fact, this makes all kinds of volatility smiles possible, be it smile-shaped, upward-
sloping, downward-sloping, or even hump-shaped. Figure 3.4 gives an example for
each kind of possible volatility smile shape and shows the related log price probability
distribution for a corresponding scenario.
Note that the volatility smile shapes in our study are induced by the characteristics
of permit price distributions under the real measure. As for traditional energy com-
modities, it can be assumed that market participants perceive high permit prices as
bad states (see Geman 2005). Therefore the inclusion of risk premia might reduce the
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downward-slope of the smile predicted by the distribution of underlying permit prices
in our model.
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4. Reduced-Form Models:
Calibration and Option Pricing
4.1. Introduction
As shown in the previous chapter, the design of an emission trading system induces
specific features of the permit price dynamics. This gives rise to the natural questions
whether these features are represented in observed futures and option prices, and how
market models should be specified to capture them appropriately. Reduced-form market
models for emission permits are intended to account for these particularities without
having the complexity of full equilibrium models. Starting from Proposition 2 of the
last chapter, we obtain a reduced-form model framework by following the approach
of Carmona and Hinz (2011) to specify the dynamics of economy-wide cumulative
emissions directly under the risk-neutral measure. Within this framework, we evaluate
a battery of different model variants with respect to their historical fit to futures prices
as well as their in- and out-of-sample option pricing performance.
Most of the empirical literature on emission permits focuses on the calibration of stan-
dard models like geometric Brownian motion, jump-diffusion, mean-reverting, regime-
switching, or GARCH models to European emission permit spot, futures, or option
prices (see Wagner 2007; Paolella and Taschini 2008; Benz and Tru¨ck 2009; Daskalakis
et al. 2009; Frey 2010). Carmona and Hinz (2011) are the first to propose reduced-form
models that account for the specific properties of emission permits and are still feasible
for calibration to futures or option prices. They exemplarily calibrate a model for one
single compliance period to market prices from 2007 to 2009, on the one hand to fu-
tures with maturity in 2012, on the other hand to options. The authors further propose a
market model accounting for two compliance periods and derive related option pricing
formulae, but refrain from a calibration of the two-period model. Gru¨ll and Taschini
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(2009) evaluate the historical model fit of the Carmona and Hinz (2011) one-period
model and another reduced-form model derived from the Chesney and Taschini (2012)
framework based on historical futures prices from Phase I and Phase II. As bench-
mark models they use a geometric Brownian motion and a normal-inverse Gaussian
(NIG) process. Still, there is no paper until now assessing the performance of different
reduced-form specifications within a unified model framework, neither regarding his-
torical fit to futures prices nor with respect to option pricing. Especially, none of the
existing studies reports on the historical or implicit calibration of reduced-form models
that account for more than one compliance period. Consequently there is no evidence
yet on how reduced-form models should be specified in order to fit futures and option
prices observed in the market in an appropriate way.
In the next section, we deduce our reduced-form model framework for emission per-
mits as a generic extension of the Carmona and Hinz (2011) model. We specify the
dynamics of the single price components and reduce the specification problem to the
parametrization of the emissions’ volatility by showing that all emissions processes in a
certain class lead to the same class of futures price dynamics. For option pricing we rely
on the approach of Carmona and Hinz (2011) and generalize it to our framework. Sec-
tion 4.3 presents the futures and option data for our empirical analysis. In Section 4.4,
we develop a general estimation approach based on the unscented Kalman filter. We
calibrate a battery of different model specifications to historical futures prices and eval-
uate their empirical performance. Section 4.5 investigates the in- and out-of-sample
option pricing performance of our model variants based on implicit calibration.
4.2. Reduced-Form Models for Emission Permits
4.2.1. Model Framework
Our goal is to deduce a framework of reduced-form models for emission permit prices
that can be calibrated to market data and is feasible for option pricing. Instead of
modeling permit spot prices, we model the dynamics of intra-period permit futures di-
rectly, first because these are the most liquid contracts traded in the context of emission
trading systems, and second because options are usually written on futures and not on
the permits themselves. Our starting point is Proposition 2 of the last chapter, which
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characterizes the prices of emission permits traded within an emission trading system
with compliance periods [0, T1], [T1, T2], . . . , [Tn−1, Tn]. As the first step, we write the
price of futures on period-1 emission permits with maturity t ∈ [0, T1) at time t ∈ [0, t]
under the risk-neutral measure Q. Since all agents are modeled with risk-neutral pref-
erences in Chapter 3, the transition from the real to the risk-neutral measure is trivial.90
Together with the cost-of-carry relationship for intra-period futures, (3.14), we directly
obtain
F (t, t) =
n∑
j=1
e−r(Tj−t)Qt
{
xTj > qj
}
pj . (4.1)
While this approach models all compliance periods of the emissions trading system
explicitly, the results of Chapter 3 suggest that the binary character of emission permit
prices is less apparent when the end of the compliance period is in the remote future.
Therefore it appears natural to consider alternative models that account only for the
first m ≤ n compliance periods explicitly and model the remaining value by a price
component Rt that does not account for the binary character of emission permit prices
and follows a standard process for futures price dynamics. Futures prices are then given
by
F (t, t) =
m∑
j=1
e−r(Tj−t)Qt
{
xTj > qj
}
pj +Rt. (4.2)
Note that for m = n and Rt = 0 we exactly obtain the original model (4.1).
4.2.2. Dynamics of Price Components
In the context of Chapter 3, the cumulative emissions xTk at the end of compliance
period k depend on the dynamics of the economy-wide emissions process given by
(3.9) and (3.10), particularly on the endogenous optimal abatement strategy. Since this
dependency makes it difficult to calibrate the full equilibrium model to market data,
we take a simplified approach: For each compliance period k, we consider the time-t
expected cumulative emissions up to the end of the period, Tk, that is xTk|t = Et {xTk}.
Obviously, we have xTk|Tk = xTk for all k = 1, . . . ,m, such that (4.2) holds when
replacing xTk by xTk|Tk .
90In Section 4.4 we make the reverse transition from the risk-neutral to the real measure and depart from the
assumption of risk-neutral agents by introducing risk premia explicitly.
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According to the reduced-form approach of Carmona and Hinz (2011), we model the
dynamics of xTk|t, k = 1, . . . ,m, directly under the risk-neutral measure, in form of
exogenous Itoˆ processes
dxTk|t = µk(t, xTk|t)dt+ σk(t, xTk|t)dW
k
t . (4.3)
With (4.3), the dynamics of the risk-neutral shortage probabilitiesAk,t := Qt {xTk > qk}
for the single compliance periods k = 1, . . . ,m can be derived.
As a simple example, choose an arithmetic Brownian motion
dxTk|t = µk(t)dt+ σk(t)dW
k
t (4.4)
with time-dependent drift µk(t) and volatility σk(t). Given xTk|t, xTk is normally
distributed with mean xTk|t +
∫ Tk
t
µk(s)ds and variance
∫ Tk
t
σ2k(s)ds, so that we have
Ak,t = Φ
xTk|t + ∫ Tkt µk(s)ds− qk√∫ Tk
t
σ2k(s)ds
 , (4.5)
where Φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution function. By Itoˆ’s Lemma, we
obtain the dynamics of Ak,t as
dAk,t =
∂Ak,t
∂xTk|t
σk(t)dW
k
t
= Φ′
xTk|t + ∫ Tkt µk(s)ds− qk√∫ Tk
t
σ2k(s)ds
 1√∫ Tk
t
σ2k(s)ds
σk(t)dW
k
t
= Φ′
(
Φ−1(Ak,t)
) σk(t)√∫ Tk
t
σ2k(s)ds
dW kt
= Φ′
(
Φ−1(Ak,t)
)√
zk(t)dW
k
t ,
(4.6)
where Φ′ is the first derivative of Φ and zk(t) =
σ2k(t)∫ Tk
t σ
2
k(s)ds
. Note that the drift of Ak,t
results to zero since we have Qt {Ak,τ} = Qt {Qτ {xTk > qk}} = Qt {xTk > qk} =
Ak,t for all τ > t due to the law of iterated expectations, which implies the martingale
property. The volatility of the risk-neutral shortage probabilities Ak is determined by
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the ratio of the emissions processes’ instantaneous volatility and its future volatility
until the end of the compliance period Tk.
It is nearby to argue that an arithmetic Brownian motion is an inappropriate choice for
the dynamics of expected cumulative emissions because it can attain negative values,
and a geometric Brownian motion is more favorable. Another proposal could be to
choose a mean-reverting process for (logarithmic) expected cumulative emissions to
represent the mechanism that high emission levels lead to higher prices that trigger
more abatement measures, leading to decreasing emissions then. Surprisingly, we can
show in Appendix B.1 that all according choices for the emissions processes lead to the
same class of dynamics for Ak as (4.6).
If an additional price component Rt 6= 0 is incorporated, we take the modeling ap-
proach
Rt = e
−r(max{t,Tm}−t)Am+1,t, (4.7)
distinguishing between the two cases m = 0 and m ≥ 1. For m ≥ 1, Am+1,t describes
the expected value of an emission permit directly after Tm, the end of the last compli-
ance period explicitly modeled, conditional on time-t information. For m = 0, when
none of the compliance periods is modeled explicitly, we have F (t, t) = Rt = Am+1,t
such that Am+1 captures the entire futures price. In contrast to the particular form (4.6)
for the shortage probabilities A1, . . . , Am, we are rather free in the choice of the dy-
namics of Am+1, but at least we require that all price components are non-negative and
permit futures prices are martingales under the risk-neutral measure. Since the prices
of the shortage probabilities are non-negative martingales per definition, it is left to
demand that Am+1 is a non-negative martingale as well. In this thesis we focus on a
component following a geometric Brownian motion
dAm+1,t = σRAm+1,tdW
m+1
t , (4.8)
which is one of the simplest models fulfilling the required properties and an often-used
standard model for futures price dynamics since the seminal work of Black (1976).
Altogether, the price dynamics of emission permit futures according to (4.2) derives
from the dynamics ofA1, . . . , Am+1 given by (4.6) and (4.8) and the correlation matrix
of the Wiener processes W 1, . . . ,Wm+1, which we denote as (ρk1k2)k1,k2=1,...,m+1.
Note that for the case m = 2 and without additional price component, i.e., Rt = 0, we
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exactly obtain the two-period market model proposed by Carmona and Hinz (2011),
such that our framework can be seen as a generic extension of this approach.
4.2.3. Option Pricing
We generalize the option pricing formulae derived by Carmona and Hinz (2011) to
our framework of models with an arbitrary number of binary price components and
eventually an additional component following a geometric Brownian motion. Using
the transformation λk = Φ−1(Ak), k = 1, . . . ,m, and λm+1 = lnAm+1, the futures
price given by (4.2) can be written as91
F (t, t) =
m∑
j=1
e−r(Tj−t)Φ(λj,t)pj + e−r(max{t,Tm}−t)eλm+1,t . (4.9)
The price of a European call option with strike price K and maturity τ written on the
futures contract F is then
C(t, τ,K) = e−r(τ−t)EQt
{
(F (τ, t)−K)+}
= e−r(τ−t)EQt
{( m∑
j=1
e−r(Tj−t)Φ(λj,τ )pj + e−r(max{t,Tm}−t)eλm+1,τ −K
)+}
.
(4.10)
We obtain the dynamics of λ1, . . . , λm+1, from (4.6) by applying Itoˆ’s Lemma, which
yields
dλk,t =
1
2
λk,tzk(t)dt+
√
zk(t)dW
k
t , k = 1, . . . ,m,
dλm+1,t = −1
2
σ2Rdt+ σRdW
m+1
t .
(4.11)
Given λk,t, we can write λk,τ with τ > t in explicit form according to Karatzas and
Shreve (1991), pp. 360–361. In particular, the explicit form for λk,τ , k = 1, . . . ,m, is
given by
λk,τ = e
1
2
∫ τ
t
zk(s)dsλk,t +
∫ τ
t
e
1
2
∫ τ
s
zk(u)du
√
zk(s)dW
k
s , (4.12)
91ForRt = 0, simply drop the last term e−r(max{t,Tm}−t)eλm+1,t in (4.9) and all subsequent equations.
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and for λm+1,τ we have the well-known form
λm+1,τ = λm+1,t − 1
2
σ2R(τ − t) +
∫ τ
t
σRdW
m+1
s . (4.13)
Therefore, (λ1,τ , . . . , λm+1,τ ) is normally distributed and we can write (4.10) as
C(t, τ,K) = e−r(τ−t)
∫
Rm+1
( m∑
j=1
e−r(Tj−t)Φ(xj)pj
+ e−r(max{t,Tm}−t)exm+1 −K
)+
· ϕ(µt,τ , νt,τ ;x1, x2, . . . , xm+1)(dx1, dx2, . . . , dxm+1), (4.14)
where ϕ(µt,τ , νt,τ ; .) is the density of a m + 1-variate normal distribution with mean
µt,τ = (µ
k
t,τ )k=1,...,m+1 and covariance matrix νt,τ = (ν
k1,k2
t,τ )k1,k2=1,...,m+1 given
by
µkt,τ = E
Q
t {λk,τ} = λk,te
1
2
∫ τ
t
zk(s)ds, k = 1, . . . ,m, (4.15)
µm+1t,τ = E
Q
t {λm+1,τ} = λm+1,t −
1
2
σ2R(τ − t), (4.16)
and
νk1,k2t,τ = Cov
Q
t {λk1,τ , λk2,τ}
=
∫ τ
t
e
1
2
∫ τ
s
(zk1 (u)+zk2 (u))du
√
zk1(s)
√
zk2(s)ρk1k2ds, k1, k2 = 1, . . . ,m,
(4.17)
νk,m+1t,τ = Cov
Q
t {λk,τ , λm+1,τ}
=
∫ τ
t
e
1
2
∫ τ
s
zk(u)du
√
zk(s)σRρkm+1ds, k = 1, . . . ,m,
(4.18)
νm+1,m+1t,τ = Var
Q
t {λm+1,τ} = σ2R(τ − t). (4.19)
All integrals can be evaluated efficiently by numerical integration. As Appendix B.2
shows, one can reduce the computational effort in some cases by evaluating the integrals
in a particular order. The price of a European put option with the same strike price and
maturity follows directly from the put-call parity.
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4.2.4. Model Specification
We specify different model variants within our framework in order to evaluate their em-
pirical performance. Particularly we are interested in the aspect of multiple compliance
periods, the specification of an additional price component for compliance periods that
are not explicitly modeled, and the choice of the emissions process. As seen in Sec-
tion 4.2.2, the last point reduces to the choice of the emissions’ volatility parametriza-
tion.
A geometric Brownian motion (GBM) is the simplest model variant within our frame-
work, modeling no compliance period explicitly and taking the whole price as an “addi-
tional” component. Representing classical standard models for futures price dynamics
at the same time, it perfectly serves as a benchmark model for assessing reduced-form
models that account for at least one compliance period explicitly.92 In this sense, the
simplest non-degenerate reduced-form model we analyze is a model having one ex-
plicitly modeled compliance period as the single price component. Furthermore, we
evaluate models with one explicit compliance period plus an additional price compo-
nent, and specifications with two explicitly modeled compliance periods.
According to (4.6), the exact parametrization zk of the single price components results
from the volatility functions σk of the emissions processes (4.3). However, it is more
convenient to specify zk directly, and Carmona and Hinz (2011) show that for every
continuous function zk : (0, T )→ R+ satisfying
lim
t→Tk
∫ t
0
zk(s)ds =∞, (4.20)
there exists a continuous function σk : (0, Tk) → R+ that fulfills σ
2
k(t)∫ Tk
t σ
2
k(s)ds
= zk(t).
These authors consider the parametrizations zCHk (t) =
βk
Tk−t with βk > 0 and z
CHα
k (t) =
βk
(Tk−t)αk , which fulfills condition (4.20) for βk > 0 and αk ≥ 1. They note, however,
that an unconstrained estimation of zCHαk to empirical data tends to yield an αk that is
smaller than 1. We thus propose a different two-parameter specification zCSCHk (t) =
92Unlike Gru¨ll and Taschini (2009) and others, we exclude more sophisticated standard models, e.g., NIG
processes, from our analysis, since our focus is on the performance of reduced-form models within a pure
Itoˆ framework. We leave it open for future research to consider a reduced-form model framework for
emission permit prices based on general Le´vy processes.
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Table 4.1.: Specification of reduced-form model variants. GBM is a geometric Brow-
nian motion, having no explicitly modeled compliance period, but an addi-
tional component within our framework. For the names of the other variants,
the number followed by “P” stands for the number of compliance periods ex-
plicitly modeled, “CH” or “CSCH” stands for the specific parametrization
of zk, and “R” specifies the existence of an additional price component.
Price Components Compliance Periods Add. Component zk
GBM 1 0 X –
1PCH 1 1 – CH
1PCSCH 1 1 – CSCH
1PCHR 2 1 X CH
1PCSCHR 2 1 X CSCH
2PCH 2 2 – CH
2PCSCH 2 2 – CSCH
βk
Tk
2
((
1+
Tk−t
Tk
)αk−(1−Tk−tTk )αk) .
93 This parametrization also fulfills (4.20) for αk ≥ 1,
it is equal to zCHk for αk = 1, and the empirical estimates for αk tend to be larger
than 1 for this specification, see Section 4.4 and Section 4.5. Therefore we choose the
parametrizations zCHk and z
CSCH
k for our analysis.
Overall, the combination of the different model features yields seven different model
variants, which are summarized by Table 4.1.
4.3. Data
Our empirical analysis builds on futures and option data traded in the context of the
EU ETS. We use daily prices of EUA futures and European options written on these
futures traded from January 1, 2008 to June 30, 2012 provided by the European Climate
Exchange (ECX). All prices are determined under the ECX settlement procedure that
takes place every day from 4:50 to 5:00 p.m. local time. As outlined in Section 2.3.2,
we always consider the December futures contract next to maturity and roll over to
the next contract on the last day of October. In the same way, we only consider op-
tions expiring in the next December until the last trading day of October, and then
93The motivation for this parametrization is purely technical and does not have an intuitive economic inter-
pretation. We label this parametrization by “CSCH” due to its affinity to the hyperbolic cosecant.
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Table 4.2.: Average prices, standard deviations, and number of observations for differ-
ent moneyness and maturity categories of our option sample. The cleaned
sample comprises 1,457 option prices traded from 2008 to 2012 on the ECX.
Calls Puts
Days to Maturity Days to Maturity
Moneyness <160 160-280 >280 <160 160-280 >280
deep OTM Avg. Price 1.34 0.94 0.39 0.94 0.71 0.26
StdDev. Price 0.33 0.44 0.25 0.34 0.25 0.11
Obs. 35 72 33 46 50 28
OTM Avg. Price 1.65 1.38 0.71 1.59 1.19 0.73
StdDev. Price 0.41 0.48 0.27 0.50 0.44 0.28
Obs. 138 223 132 124 174 137
ITM Avg. Price 2.07 1.91 1.28 2.50 1.81 1.14
StdDev. Price 0.31 0.54 0.26 0.74 0.49 0.34
Obs. 44 73 33 43 33 30
deep ITM Avg. Price – 3.84 – 3.66 – 2.00
StdDev. Price – 0.16 – 0.45 – 0.04
Obs. 0 5 0 2 0 2
switch over to options expiring in December of the next year. Moreover, we only
include settlement prices of options traded at least once on the same day either via
screen trading or the exchange-for-physical/exchange-for-swaps facilities of the ECX.
We apply the standard cleaning criteria for option data (see Bakshi et al. 1997; Trolle
and Schwartz 2009), that is we exclude options traded at prices smaller than 0.06 Eu-
ros as well as observations of call or put prices violating the no-arbitrage condition
C(t, τ,K) ≥ e−r(τ−t)(F (t, t)−K) or P (t, τ,K) ≥ e−r(τ−t)(K − F (t, t)). We fur-
ther follow the literature (see Dumas et al. 1998; Trolle and Schwartz 2009) and restrict
our analysis to options with moneynesses within a certain range, in our case between
0.8 and 1.2, since options that are very deep out-of-the-money (OTM) or in-the-money
(ITM) are typically subject to large pricing biases.
After this procedure, our sample contains 1,457 observations which are categorized
with respect to moneyness and time to maturity in Table 4.2. Moneyness categories
are defined as is Section 2.3.2, i.e., a call (put) option is OTM for a moneyness be-
tween 1 and 1.15 (0.85 and 1), deep OTM if its moneyness is larger (smaller) than 1.15
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(0.85), ITM if the moneyness is between 0.85 and 1 (1 and 1.15), and deep ITM if
the moneyness is smaller (larger) than 0.85 (1.15). We differentiate between maturi-
ties longer than 280 days, maturities between 160 and 280 days, and maturities shorter
than 160 days. Our cleaned sample consists to almost equal parts of calls (about 54%)
and put options (about 46%). Moreover, the price observations of our sample are well
distributed over maturity categories, whereas the medium maturity category accounts
for more observations than either the short and long maturities. In line with the overall
transaction volumes considered in Section 2.3.2, the number of OTM options in our
sample largely overweighs the number of ITM options. In contrast, deep OTM options
are less represented in our cleaned sample than in the full data set due to our sample
selection procedure. The selection of options with expiry in the directly following De-
cember only, the exclusion of options traded at small prices, and finally the selected
range of moneynesses are all to the disadvantage of very deep OTM options.
The term structure of risk-free interest rates is obtained using EURIBOR rates for ma-
turities up to one year and EuroSwap rates for longer maturities. For a given maturity,
we linearly interpolate the two interest rates whose maturities straddle it.
4.4. Calibration to Historical Data
To calibrate reduced-form models to historical permit futures prices, we need to spec-
ify the dynamics under the real measure. Assuming constant market prices of risk
h1, . . . , hm, hR the processes W˜ kt = W
k
t −hkt, k = 1, . . . ,m, and W˜m+1t = Wm+1t −
hRt are Brownian motions under the real measure and the dynamics of the shortage
probabilities and the additional price component follow from (4.6) and (4.8) as
dAk,t = Φ
′ (Φ−1(Ak,t))hk√zk(t)dt
+ Φ′
(
Φ−1(Ak,t)
)√
zk(t)dW˜
k
t , k = 1, . . . ,m,
dAm+1,t = σRhRAm+1,tdt+ σRAm+1,tdW˜
m+1
t .
(4.21)
If the single Ak are all observable in the market, parameters can simply be estimated
by maximum likelihood according to Carmona and Hinz (2011). This would be given
if futures contracts with maturities in all compliance periods considered were traded
with sufficient liquidity. However, it is rather the case that only futures contracts of the
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ongoing compliance period are sufficiently liquid, so that only the futures price F of
current emission permits can be observed. Thus we require an approach that decom-
poses the aggregate emission permit price into its single value components according
to (4.2).
4.4.1. Methodology
We estimate the reduced-form model variants by quasi-maximum likelihood in con-
junction with the unscented Kalman filter. We work again with the transformation
λk = Φ
−1(Ak), k = 1, . . . ,m, and λm+1 = lnAm+1, and apply Itoˆ’s Lemma to
obtain the resulting dynamics from (4.21) as
dλk,t = (hk
√
zk(t) +
1
2
λk,tzk(t))dt+
√
zk(t)dW˜
k
t , k = 1, . . . ,m,
dλm+1,t = (σRhR − 1
2
σ2R)dt+ σRdW˜
m+1
t ,
(4.22)
and the futures price is given by (4.9). The Kalman filter allows to extract the paths
of the latent state variables λ1, . . . , λm+1 from a time series of observed futures prices
F (t, t) according to the given system of equations. Based on the dynamics (4.22) of the
state variables with fixed parameter values (h1, β1, α1, . . . , hm, βm, αm, hR, σR) and
their relation to the futures price (4.9), variations of the futures price F can be statisti-
cally attributed to variations of the single state variables. If, for example, futures prices
F fluctuate exactly according to a geometric Brownian motion with parameters hR
and σR, these movements are most likely caused by the last price component in (4.9),
while fluctuations of the other state variables would lead to futures price variations that
are not completely in line with a geometric Brownian motion. By retransforming the
estimated paths of the state variables λ1, . . . , λm+1 to the risk-neutral shortage prob-
abilities Ak = Φ(λk), k = 1, . . . ,m, and the component Am+1 = eλm+1 , we obtain
a statistical decomposition of the observed futures prices F into the single price com-
ponents e−r(Tk−t)Akpk, k = 1, . . . ,m, which are attributable to the m compliance
periods explicitly modeled, and the additional price componentR according to (4.2).
Technically, we cast our model given by equations (4.9) and (4.22) into the state-space
form, which consists of a measurement and a transition equation. The transition equa-
tion describes the dynamics of the latent variables λ1, . . . , λm+1 in discrete time. It is
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obtained by discretizing (4.22) as
λ1,t+1
...
λm+1,t+1
 = Gt +Ht

λ1,t
...
λm+1,t
+ wt (4.23)
with
Gt =

h1
√
z1(t)
...
hm
√
zm(t)
σRhR − 12σ2R
 and Ht =

1 + 12z1(t) 0 . . . 0
0
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . 1 + 12zm(t) 0
0 . . . 0 1

(4.24)
and independently distributed error terms wt ∼ N (0,Ωt) with covariance matrix
Ωt =

z1(t) . . . ρ1m
√
z1(t)zm(t) ρ1m+1
√
z1(t)σR
...
. . .
...
...
ρ1m
√
z1(t)zn(t) . . . zm(t) ρmm+1
√
zm(t)σR
ρ1m+1
√
z1(t)σR . . . ρmm+1
√
zm(t)σR σ
2
R
 .
(4.25)
The measurement equation defines the relationship between the values of the latent
state variables λ1, . . . , λm+1 and permit futures prices F observed in the market. It
follows from (4.9) as
F (t, t) =
m∑
j=1
e−r(Tj−t)Φ(λj,t)pj + e−r(max{t,Tm}−t)eλm+1,t + ut, (4.26)
where ut ∼ N (0, ψ) represents an independent and identically distributed error term.
The error ut accounts for the fact that market prices can only be observed up to a certain
accuracy due to bid-ask spreads and minimum tick sizes. We set the variance ψ to 0.01
according to a minimum tick size of 0.01 Euros in the European carbon market.
While the standard Kalman (1960) filter is based on transition and measurement equa-
tions that are linear in the state variables, the measurement equation (4.26) is highly
nonlinear in our case by the occurrence of cumulative normal distributions and the ex-
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ponential function. We therefore use the square-root unscented Kalman filter developed
by van der Merwe and Wan (2001), an algorithm that handles the nonlinearities in a
robust and computationally efficient way. Especially, the unscented Kalman filter iden-
tifies the latent states much more accurately than a pure linearization technique (known
as the extended Kalman filter), as pointed out by Christoffersen et al. (2012). Since the
implementation of the unscented Kalman filter is rather generic once the state-space
form is given, we refer to van der Merwe and Wan (2001) and Appendix B of Carr and
Wu (2010) for details.94 The Kalman filter also enables us to compute the log-likelihood
function for the given set of parameters (h1, β1, α1, . . . , hm, βm, αm, hR, σR). We es-
timate the parameters by numerically maximizing the likelihood with respect to the
model parameters using the Nelder-Mead algorithm.95
4.4.2. Results
Table 4.3 shows parameter estimates and standard errors for the different model vari-
ants, as well as the log-likelihood and the value of the AIC. The parameter estimates
for a GBM reveal that EUA prices fluctuate by approximately 37.6% per year, and the
drift coefficient is negative according to a considerable decline of EUA prices for the
period of investigation. This negative price drift is also reflected by the h1 parameter
of reduced-form models for one compliance period, 1PCH and 1PCSCH. For the mod-
els with two price components it is eye-catching that the first component has a highly
negative drift, while the h2 or hR parameter of the second component is positive. This
corresponds to the behavior of the single price components, filtered as part of our es-
timation procedure (see Figure 4.1). Consistently across all model variants with two
price components, we observe that the first price component of EUA futures, which
is attributable to Phase II of the EU ETS, collapsed in 2008 and 2009. This is in line
with anecdotal evidence from the market, saying that the main part of the EUA price
traded in the second half of Phase II is attributable to the following compliance period
from 2013 to 2020. Due the economic downturn in consequence of the financial crisis,
94The only non-generic point is the initialization procedure. Since the transition equation is non-stationary
in all of its components, we initialize the unscented Kalman filter by using diffuse priors (see Harvey
1989, pp. 121-122). In particular, we employ the approach of Rosenberg (1973) to treat the initial state
as fixed and unknown, and infer it by maximum likelihood estimation (see Durbin and Koopman 2001,
pp. 117-188).
95For the model parametrization zCHk , the parameters α1, . . . , αm are set to 1 and not included into the
numerical optimization.
68
4.4. Calibration to Historical Data
T a
bl
e
4.
3.
:H
is
to
ri
ca
l
pa
ra
m
et
er
es
tim
at
es
an
d
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
(i
n
pa
re
nt
he
se
s)
fo
r
th
e
di
ff
er
en
t
m
od
el
va
ri
an
ts
de
fin
ed
in
Se
c-
tio
n
4.
2.
4.
A
ll
m
od
el
s
ar
e
ca
lib
ra
te
d
to
E
U
A
fu
tu
re
s
pr
ic
es
fr
om
Ja
nu
ar
y
1,
20
08
to
Ju
ne
30
,2
01
2
pr
ov
id
ed
by
th
e
E
C
X
.W
e
re
po
rt
th
e
m
ax
im
iz
ed
va
lu
e
of
th
e
lo
g-
lik
el
ih
oo
d
fu
nc
tio
n
(L
L
F)
as
w
el
la
s
th
e
va
lu
e
of
th
e
A
ka
ik
e
in
fo
rm
a-
tio
n
cr
ite
ri
on
(A
IC
).
If
k
is
th
e
nu
m
be
r
of
m
od
el
pa
ra
m
et
er
s
an
d
d
th
e
nu
m
be
r
of
no
n-
st
at
io
na
ry
st
at
e
va
ri
ab
le
s,
th
e
A
IC
is
de
fin
ed
as
A
I
C
=
2(
k
+
d
)
−
2L
L
F
(s
ee
H
ar
ve
y
19
89
,p
.2
70
).
h
1
β
1
α
1
h
2
β
2
α
2
h
R
σ
R
ρ
L
L
F
A
IC
G
B
M
—
—
—
—
—
—
−0
.4
58
0.
37
6
—
56
8.
27
−1
1
3
0
.5
3
(0
.4
65
)
(0
.0
09
)
1P
C
H
−0
.6
03
0.
18
2
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
46
9.
68
−9
3
3
.3
5
(0
.4
68
)
(0
.0
09
)
1P
C
SC
H
−0
.6
03
0.
25
9
1.
46
5
—
—
—
—
—
—
47
5.
22
−9
4
2
.4
5
(0
.4
73
)
(0
.0
29
)
(0
.1
50
)
1P
C
H
R
−5
.6
10
0.
40
1
—
—
—
—
0.
21
6
0.
32
7
0.
51
8
57
4
.4
4
−1
1
3
4
.8
7
(0
.5
82
)
(0
.0
44
)
(0
.4
98
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
61
)
1P
C
SC
H
R
−5
.7
07
54
5.
74
0
12
.1
81
—
—
—
0.
13
1
0.
32
7
0.
59
7
57
9
.2
7
−1
1
4
2
.5
5
(0
.5
88
)
(1
06
0.
23
1)
(3
.0
36
)
(0
.5
27
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
63
)
2P
C
H
−5
.5
87
0.
39
4
—
0.
19
1
0.
44
4
—
—
—
0.
41
9
57
5
.8
8
−1
1
3
7
.7
6
(0
.5
55
)
(0
.0
43
)
(0
.4
98
)
(0
.0
25
)
(0
.0
81
)
2P
C
SC
H
−5
.6
29
38
4.
77
0
11
.4
66
0.
33
5
9.
37
5
6.
00
8
—
—
0.
47
7
58
4
.1
9
−1
1
5
0
.3
8
(0
.5
64
)
(6
54
.7
42
)
(2
.6
31
)
(0
.5
33
)
(6
.4
49
)
(1
.1
91
)
(0
.0
69
)
69
Chapter 4. Reduced-Form Models: Calibration and Option Pricing
Model-Based Decomposition of Futures Prices
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Figure 4.1.: Paths of single price components according to (4.2) as estimated by histor-
ical calibration to EUA futures prices. The upper panel shows the observed
futures price ( ) decomposed into the first ( ) and second ( ) price com-
ponent as filtered by our estimation procedure. The lower panel presents
the first and second price component for the 1PCHR ( ), 1PCSCHR ( ),
2PCH ( ) and 2PCSCH ( ) model.
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expected cumulative emissions for Phase II were low and a permit shortage in 2012
was highly unlikely. For Phase III, however, tighter allocations and the volatility of
emissions lead to a significant probability of penalty payments to accrue, and a value
component clearly larger than zero. The relatively low standard error for the drift pa-
rameter of the first price component in two-period models confirms that this collapse
can be precisely identified by the statistical estimation procedure. To the contrary, we
observe large standard errors for the drift parameter of the second price component
and also for the models with only one price component, suggesting that a drift cannot
clearly be established in these cases.
The volatility parameters of these models can also be interpreted in light of the behavior
of the single price components. Since the σR of the 1P(CS)CHR model96 describes the
second price component, which behaves much less turbulent than the first one, the
parameter estimates are smaller than the σR for the GBM, which captures the volatility
of the whole prices. Similarly, the parameter β1 of the 1PCHR and 2PCH model,
representing the volatility of the first price component, is clearly larger than the β1 of the
whole prices as estimated in context of the 1PCH model. The volatility parameter for a
one-parameter volatility function can be estimated with high precision, as indicated by
low corresponding standard errors across all model variants GBM, 1PCH, 1PCHR, and
2PCH. In contrast, standard errors are extremely large for the βk parameters of two-
parameter volatility functions in case of models with two price components, 1PCSCHR
and 2PCSCH. This observation suggests that in these cases the volatility function can
be described almost equally well by other combinations of αk and βk and the likelihood
function is very flat in the direction of these parameters.
Finally, the correlation ρ of the risk factors driving the two price components is consis-
tently between 0.4 and 0.6 for all model variants, with low standard errors. Especially
for the 2P(CS)CH model, where the risk factors stand for the stochastic dynamics of
expected cumulative emissions for the two compliance periods, it makes intuitive sense
that the Wiener processes are not uncorrelated, but also not perfectly correlated: On
the one hand, the emissions until the end of the first compliance period are obviously
part of the cumulative emissions until the end of the second one, but on the other hand,
the expected emissions within the second compliance period are also driven by other,
longer-term factors.
96We abbreviate by writing “(CS)CH” when a statement holds for both the CH and the CSCH parametriza-
tion.
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We compare the historical fit of the estimated models by the log-likelihood of the
Kalman filter estimation and the AIC. The AIC adjusts the log-likelihood value by
penalizing the number of free model parameters and latent variables and allows for
comparisons between non-nested models. It is eye-catching that all model specifica-
tions with two price components show a better historical fit than a GBM, which is the
benchmark model within our framework, while the market models for one compliance
period, 1PCH and 1PCSCH, perform worse. The flaw of these one-period market mod-
els is that they capture the binary behavior of the first price component, but neglect the
value coming from the following compliance periods. Since the historical EUA prices
do not show a clear tendency to converge to zero or the penalty in 2012, these models
show a bad fit to historical data. In contrast, a GBM does not represent any of the binary
price properties, but can in principle attain all prices at the end of the compliance period
in 2012. Market models with two price components incorporate both the binary price
properties as well as the value component of the next compliance period. These models
provide additional degrees of freedom compared to the simpler specifications, but they
also impose more structure on the EUA futures prices. The fact that they perform better
than the models with only one price component even in terms of the AIC, which cor-
rects for the number of parameters and latent variables, shows that this structure is very
well represented by empirical data and should not be neglected when specifying mar-
ket models for emission permit prices. Among the variants with two price components,
models explicitly accounting for two compliance periods show a better fit than models
with one compliance period plus an additional component, but especially for the simple
parametrizations 1PCHR and 2PCH the difference is very small. Using a specification
with two parameters improves the performance, measured by the AIC, in all cases.
As a last plausibility check, we consider the volatility σ1(t) of the expected cumulative
emissions xT1|t according to (4.4), which is determined by the form of z1(t) and the
parameter values β1 and α1. Economic intuition suggests that the volatility of xT1|t de-
creases towards the end of the compliance period when the major part of the cumulative
emissions is known already. Figure 4.2 shows that this argument clearly favors the two-
period models with two volatility parameters βk and αk, which follow this behavior for
the parameters estimated. Contrary, the one-period models or the simpler models with
αk = 1 imply that the volatility of expected cumulative emissions increases towards
infinity at the end of the compliance period.
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Figure 4.2.: Volatility functions σ1(t) of expected cumulative emissions xT1|t accord-
ing to (4.4) for the models 1PCH (solid), 1PCHR (dashed), and 2PCH
(dot-dashed) plotted in blue and the corresponding models with additional
volatility parameter α1 plotted in purple. σ1(t) is the p.a. volatility of xT1|t
given by σ1(t) =
√
z1(t)e
− ∫ t
0
z1(s)ds (see Carmona and Hinz 2011). The
solid vertical line marks the end of our sample period on June 30, 2012.
Parameters are chosen according to the historical estimates in Table 4.3.
Altogether, our results reveal that appropriately specified market models for emission
permits outperform standard models for futures price dynamics — as represented by
a geometric Brownian motion within our framework — with respect to the histori-
cal fit. While models consisting of one binary price component standing for a single
compliance period perform very poorly, an additional price component, be it in form
of another explicitly modeled compliance period or an unspecific component evolving
according to a geometric Brownian motion, leads to a large improvement of the per-
formance. Furthermore, reduced-form models with two volatility parameters βk and
αk explain historical EUA futures prices better than the simple parametrization with
αk = 1. For the models with two price components, the additional parameter αk also
leads to an expected cumulative emissions’ volatility function that is in line with the
economic intuition.
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4.5. Option Pricing
We evaluate the option pricing performance of the different model variants for the sam-
ple of option prices described in Section 4.3. To get a first impression of the structural
properties of EUA option prices, we plot the average volatility smiles for the years 2009
to 2012, see Figure 4.3. It is eye-catching that the smile is flat in 2009, while there ac-
tually exists a smile for 2010 and later. The flat smile in 2009 is completely in line
with the observation of Carmona and Hinz (2011) that within their sample period, until
the end of September 2009, “traders [...] priced EUA options using Black 76 formula”.
Such a flat smile is, however, very unusual for any kind of option market, and existed
most probably because traders used very simplified valuation methods during this early
stage of the Phase II EUA option market. As the other plots show, the option market
departed from a flat smile in the following years to a downward-sloping smile, and the
downward-slope increased more and more from 2010 to 2012. This observation partic-
ularly confirms our model prediction of a downward-sloping smile from Section 3.4.3
and suggests that the market has learnt about the distributional properties of emission
permit prices as induced by the design of the system, which are represented by option
prices.
4.5.1. Parameter Estimation
To calibrate the reduced-form model specifications to observed option prices, we min-
imize the pricing errors between empirical prices and model-based theoretical prices
according to (4.10) with respect to the parameter values (β1, α1, . . . , βm, αm, σR).
Option prices also depend on the state variables λ1, . . . , λm+1, which we assume to
follow the paths estimated from historical futures prices in Section 4.4. By this ap-
proach we proceed on the assumption that the states of the latent variables can be very
well extracted from historical futures price data, and the additional information about
the state variables contained in option prices is relatively small. Overall, our estimation
approach is a two-stage procedure that achieves computational feasibility by inferring
information about the state variables from historical futures prices, before re-estimating
the model parameters using option data.97 We re-calibrate the models for each month
97Similar two-stage procedures are frequently applied for other model classes, especially multi-factor
stochastic volatility models, see for example Broadie et al. (2007).
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Figure 4.3.: Average volatility smile of EUA options for each year from 2009 to 2012.
Smiles are calculated as the average difference between the Black (1976)
implied volatility for the particular moneyness and the at-the-money im-
plied volatility.
of our option data set. For that, we minimize aggregate pricing errors between theo-
retical and empirical option prices as measured by the relative root-mean-squared error
(RRMSE). The RRMSE makes the estimates as robust as possible with respect to dif-
ferent performance measures (see Christoffersen and Jacobs 2004). We use numerical
minimization based on the Nelder-Mead algorithm, setting the historical parameter es-
timates from Section 4.4 as starting values.
Table 4.4 shows the results of the implicit estimation. Since we get different implied
parameter estimates for each month of our sample according to the re-calibration proce-
dure, we report both the mean and the standard deviation of the implied estimates over
all months of our sample. Comparing to the historical parameter estimates in Table 4.3,
we observe that the implied and historical estimates for the correlation parameter ρ are
reasonably close to each other, especially for the models 1PCHR and 2PCH, while the
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Table 4.4.: Mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) of parameter estimates from
monthly re-calibration to option prices of the different model variants de-
fined in Section 4.2.4. Parameters are estimated by minimization of the
RRMSE between empirical and model-based theoretical option prices.
β1 α1 β2 α2 σR ρ
GBM — — — — 0.459 —
(0.119)
1PCH 0.175 — — — — —
(0.157)
1PCSCH 0.274 1.346 — — — —
(0.330) (0.375)
1PCHR 1.268 — — — 0.445 0.502
(0.489) (0.127) (0.052)
1PCSCHR 204.365 5.920 — — 0.468 0.800
(178.272) (3.186) (0.133) (0.101)
2PCH 0.844 — 0.786 — — 0.449
(0.514) (0.343) (0.104)
2PCSCH 114.021 5.137 3.679 3.075 — 0.607
(116.077) (2.888) (2.791) (1.375) (0.263)
volatility parameters deviate more strongly from the historical estimates. For the mod-
els with a one-parameter volatility function, i.e., GBM, 1PCH, 1PCHR, and 2PCH, the
implied volatility parameters are almost consistently higher than the historical ones,
with exception of the β1 parameter in the 1PCH model. This pattern is typical also for
several other markets and is usually explained by stochastic volatility that is compen-
sated by a variance risk premium (see, e.g., Carr and Wu 2009; Trolle and Schwartz
2010). It would be a natural extension of our model framework to introduce a stochas-
tic volatility factor to account for this observation. The large deviation of the implicitly
estimated parameters of two-parameter volatility functions from the historical ones are
in line with the large standard error and the resulting imprecision of the estimation
discussed before, and is also reflected by a large standard deviation of the implied pa-
rameter estimates across the single months of our sample.
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4.5.2. Pricing Performance
Based on the implied parameter estimates for each month of our data set, we evaluate
the in- and out-of-sample option pricing performance of the different model variants.
For the in-sample evaluation, we compare empirical prices of each month to theoreti-
cal prices calculated with the corresponding parameter estimates for that month. This
comparison primarily reveals whether the underlying model is able to capture the cross-
sectional properties (i.e., the volatility smile) of empirical option prices properly. For
the out-of-sample analysis, theoretical option prices are calculated based on the pa-
rameter estimates for the previous month. In addition to cross-sectional properties,
this analysis also stresses the time-series properties of option prices and points out if
they are correctly represented by the model variant under consideration. We measure
the deviations of theoretical from empirical option prices for both the in- and out-of-
sample evaluation by means of different performance measures, which are summarized
in Table 4.5, calculated over each year of our sample. Comparing the option pricing
performance of the different model variants, we mainly refer to the RRMSE measure
and use the other measures to check for robustness.
We start with the results for the years 2009 and 2010 reported in Table 4.6. In 2009,
the best in-sample fit to option prices is achieved by a Black (1976) model driven by
a GBM, which is not particularly surprising in light of the flat volatility smile during
that year. The outstanding performance of the Black (1976) model is, however, not
completely supported out-of-sample where the 1PCHR fits option prices better than a
GBM, suggesting that it captures the time series properties more properly. For 2010,
our results do not provide any clear picture which model has the best option pricing
performance. In-sample all models are very close to each other, and out-of-sample all
specifications apart from the 1P(CS)CH model show a similar performance. We re-
mark, however, that the results for this earlier part of the sample must be treated with
caution. Due to the early stage of the Phase II EUA option market, market participants
used very simple models for option pricing rather than accounting for the particulari-
ties of the emission trading system and their precise implications, which explains the
remarkably flat volatility smile in 2009. Given the overwhelming evidence from other
option markets, we believe that a totally flat volatility smile is highly unlikely to be
a permanent condition for emission permit options. That none of the model variants
is clearly favored over the others in 2010 might indicate that the market switched to
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Table 4.5.: Measures for the option pricing performance based on a set of N observed
option prices P obsi and corresponding theoretical prices P
th
i , i = 1, . . . , N .
Measure Formula
Root-mean-squared error (RMSE)
√
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
P thi − P obsi
)2
Relative root-mean-squared error (RRMSE)
√
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
P thi −P obsi
P obsi
)2
Mean absolute error (MAE) 1N
N∑
i=1
∣∣P thi − P obsi ∣∣
Mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) 1N
N∑
i=1
∣∣∣P thi −P obsiP obsi ∣∣∣
Minimum pricing error (Min) mini=1,...,N P thi − P obsi
Maximum pricing error (Max) maxi=1,...,N P thi − P obsi
Percentage of positive pricing errors (PPPE) 1N
N∑
i=1
1{P thi −P obsi ≥0}
a different regime where traders depart from using the Black (1976) model for EUA
option pricing. The results for the later years of Phase II promise more insights into
this hypothesis.
Table 4.7 summarizes the in- and out-of-sample performances for the years 2011 and
2012. The evolution of the volatility smile over the years (see Figure 4.3) suggests that
traders have adopted more sophisticated approaches for option pricing, and the state of
the EUA option market towards the end of Phase II is more likely to be representative
for current and future emissions markets in general. Our evaluation results reveal that
the best in-sample fit to option prices is achieved by the 1P(CS)CH and 2P(CS)CH
models. The 1P(CS)CH model assumes that the underlying permit price consists only
of one price component with binary payoff, and also in the 2P(CS)CH model prices are
mainly driven by one — the second — binary price component, due to the collapse of
the first component in 2009. The good in-sample performance of these models indicates
that they capture the volatility smile in emission permit option markets much better than
the 1P(CS)CHR or the Black (1976) model. In fact, the difference of the 1P(CS)CHR
model and the Black (1976) model is also small in 2011 and 2012, likewise because
of the collapse of the first price component. Although both the 1P(CS)CH and the
2P(CS)CH model are (mainly) driven by one binary component in 2011 and 2012, they
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differ in the crucial fact that the binary payoff occurs already in 2012 for the former
one, but only in 2020 for the latter. Therefore the “pull effect” to either zero or the
amount of the penalty is much stronger for the 1P(CS)CH model, and this dynamics
directly translates to the resulting option prices. This difference is brought to light by
the out-of-sample analysis, where the 2P(CS)CH model consistently outperforms the
1P(CS)CH model. Particularly in 2011, the 1P(CS)CH model shows by far the worst
out-of-sample performance of all models, highlighting that it is not able to capture the
time-series properties of EUA option prices in an appropriate way.
Overall, we find that in the later years of Phase II the best option pricing performance is
achieved by the 2P(CS)CH model, which explicitly accounts for two compliance peri-
ods of an emission trading system and the resulting binary option characteristics. This
result confirms that the market indeed developed from a regime where traders naively
used the most simple option pricing approach in this young market to a more mature
state. The results for the year 2010, which do not clearly favor one model over the oth-
ers, represent this transition. Finally, we ask if the two-parameter versions of reduced-
form permit price models yield a superior option pricing performance compared to the
one-parameter model variants. Our results show that the additional parameter slightly
improves the in-sample fit in many cases, but the out-of-sample performance often even
worsens, indicating that the additional degree of freedom rather leads to over-fitting
than to an enhancement of explanatory power.
In summary, our findings reveal that the design of an emission trading scheme and its
implications for the dynamics of permit prices are precisely reflected by option prices.
Therefore, models tailored to account for the specific properties of emission permit
prices perform best in option pricing.
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Table 4.6.: In- and out-of-sample option pricing performance in 2009 and 2010 for the
different model variants defined in Section 4.2.4. For the in-sample evalu-
ation, we compare empirical prices of each month to theoretical prices cal-
culated with the corresponding implied parameter estimates for that month.
For the out-of-sample analysis, theoretical option prices are calculated based
on the parameter estimates for the previous month. We report different per-
formance measures as listed in Table 4.5.
RMSE RRMSE MAE MAPE Min Max PPPE
In-Sample
2009
GBM 0.08 5.47% 0.06 3.92% −0.28 0.20 48.14%
1PCH 0.11 6.55% 0.08 4.79% −0.34 0.20 40.00%
1PCSCH 0.08 5.79% 0.07 4.25% −0.23 0.25 45.42%
1PCHR 0.12 6.97% 0.09 5.18% −0.52 0.42 46.78%
1PCSCHR 0.12 6.99% 0.09 5.11% −0.53 0.53 45.08%
2PCH 0.13 8.12% 0.10 5.96% −0.65 0.51 45.76%
2PCSCH 0.15 8.08% 0.10 6.08% −0.54 0.69 43.39%
2010
GBM 0.08 9.45% 0.06 7.07% −0.31 0.19 57.51%
1PCH 0.09 9.25% 0.06 6.99% −0.34 0.21 56.22%
1PCSCH 0.09 9.25% 0.06 6.99% −0.34 0.21 56.44%
1PCHR 0.08 9.47% 0.06 7.09% −0.31 0.20 57.30%
1PCSCHR 0.08 9.48% 0.06 7.10% −0.31 0.20 57.73%
2PCH 0.09 9.13% 0.07 6.96% −0.35 0.21 56.01%
2PCSCH 0.09 9.13% 0.07 6.96% −0.35 0.22 56.01%
Out-of-Sample
2009
GBM 0.17 10.06% 0.14 8.16% −0.37 0.38 63.05%
1PCH 0.22 11.89% 0.14 8.17% −0.39 0.68 52.54%
1PCSCH 0.22 11.91% 0.15 8.45% −0.39 0.67 63.39%
1PCHR 0.16 9.83% 0.13 7.63% −0.72 0.38 47.80%
1PCSCHR 0.20 11.06% 0.15 8.41% −0.60 0.73 57.29%
2PCH 0.21 12.34% 0.15 9.34% −0.77 0.45 48.81%
2PCSCH 0.36 17.74% 0.24 12.87% −1.06 0.49 29.15%
2010
GBM 0.18 17.93% 0.14 14.13% −0.43 0.38 71.24%
1PCH 0.20 19.28% 0.16 15.67% −0.47 0.50 74.89%
1PCSCH 0.20 19.27% 0.16 15.66% −0.48 0.50 74.68%
1PCHR 0.18 17.91% 0.14 14.12% −0.43 0.39 71.24%
1PCSCHR 0.18 17.94% 0.14 14.14% −0.43 0.39 71.24%
2PCH 0.19 18.05% 0.14 14.23% −0.48 0.41 71.24%
2PCSCH 0.19 18.15% 0.15 14.31% −0.48 0.41 71.03%
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Table 4.7.: In- and out-of-sample option pricing performance in 2011 and 2012 for the
different model variants defined in Section 4.2.4. For the in-sample evalu-
ation, we compare empirical prices of each month to theoretical prices cal-
culated with the corresponding implied parameter estimates for that month.
For the out-of-sample analysis, theoretical option prices are calculated based
on the parameter estimates for the previous month. We report different per-
formance measures as listed in Table 4.5.
RMSE RRMSE MAE MAPE Min Max PPPE
In-Sample
2011
GBM 0.13 13.44% 0.09 9.69% −0.46 0.30 53.49%
1PCH 0.12 11.70% 0.08 8.45% −0.38 0.29 53.68%
1PCSCH 0.12 11.71% 0.08 8.45% −0.38 0.29 53.68%
1PCHR 0.13 13.54% 0.09 9.77% −0.47 0.30 53.29%
1PCSCHR 0.13 13.54% 0.09 9.78% −0.47 0.30 53.29%
2PCH 0.12 12.14% 0.09 8.83% −0.42 0.29 52.52%
2PCSCH 0.12 12.07% 0.09 8.75% −0.39 0.29 52.33%
2012
GBM 0.07 5.80% 0.05 4.54% −0.18 0.16 50.00%
1PCH 0.05 4.41% 0.04 3.22% −0.12 0.15 49.38%
1PCSCH 0.05 4.41% 0.04 3.23% −0.12 0.15 49.38%
1PCHR 0.07 6.00% 0.06 4.70% −0.18 0.17 51.25%
1PCSCHR 0.07 6.00% 0.06 4.70% −0.18 0.17 50.62%
2PCH 0.05 4.54% 0.04 3.41% −0.12 0.17 50.00%
2PCSCH 0.05 4.42% 0.04 3.31% −0.13 0.17 48.75%
Out-of-Sample
2011
GBM 0.17 18.71% 0.14 15.19% −0.73 0.35 39.53%
1PCH 0.39 32.58% 0.20 18.57% −0.49 1.87 44.57%
1PCSCH 0.39 32.57% 0.20 18.57% −0.49 1.87 44.57%
1PCHR 0.17 18.79% 0.14 15.25% −0.77 0.35 39.53%
1PCSCHR 0.17 18.78% 0.14 15.26% −0.78 0.35 39.53%
2PCH 0.16 16.28% 0.13 13.34% −0.66 0.41 38.37%
2PCSCH 0.16 16.61% 0.13 13.43% −0.62 0.46 38.37%
2012
GBM 0.14 11.12% 0.12 9.48% −0.28 0.21 48.12%
1PCH 0.13 11.09% 0.11 9.33% −0.18 0.28 59.38%
1PCSCH 0.13 11.09% 0.11 9.33% −0.18 0.28 58.75%
1PCHR 0.14 11.22% 0.12 9.50% −0.28 0.22 47.50%
1PCSCHR 0.14 11.20% 0.12 9.47% −0.28 0.22 47.50%
2PCH 0.11 9.37% 0.10 8.04% −0.22 0.24 49.38%
2PCSCH 0.11 9.33% 0.10 8.05% −0.22 0.24 49.38%
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5. Impact of the Yearly Emissions
Announcement
5.1. Introduction
While the previous two chapters deal with the structural price features of emission
permits and related derivatives, this chapter is dedicated to the short-term dynamics of
the emission permit market. Departing from the assumption that the state of realized
emissions and the prevailing emission rate is perfectly observable for the market, we ask
whether there is a significant market reaction to news events relating to the past or future
emissions of the economy. In particular, we consider the impact of the yearly emissions
announcement event on the European carbon market. As described in Section 2.3.1, the
European Commission collects data on yearly realized emissions from the regulated
companies and releases aggregate figures in early April every year. In the notation
of Chapter 3, this event obviously conveys information about economy-wide realized
emissions xt, and it may also give an indication for the prevailing emission rate yt.
The potential impact of the yearly emissions announcement became clear in Phase I of
the EU ETS, when the first release of realized emissions data in April 2006 indicated
that economy-wide emissions for 2005 were far below the number of permits allocated
to the market. As a consequence, permits lost about two thirds of their value at ex-
tremely high trading volumes, as Figure 5.1 depicts. However, the circumstances of the
emissions announcement in 2006 can be considered as very special. First, it was the first
event of that kind for the European emissions market at all, which was still in a rather
immature state at that time. Second, preliminary information on realized emissions
was accidentally released early on the European Commission’s website, although the
official announcement date was scheduled for May 15. On April 25, emissions data of
the Czech Republic and the Netherlands became public, both indicating that emissions
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Figure 5.1.: Daily prices and trading volumes of EUA futures maturing in December
2006 from March 1 to June 30, 2006. Prices are settlement prices quoted in
Euros provided by the ECX. Trading volumes are also expressed in Euros
by multiplying the daily number of traded contracts by the contract size
of 1,000 EUAs per contract and the daily settlement price. The dashed
vertical line marks April 25, 2006, the date when first parts of the realized
emissions data for 2005 were published.
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were considerably below the quotas. Further information for the other participating
states was released on the following days. In this sense, the emissions announcement
in 2006 can be rather considered as an unscheduled event. Altogether, it is far from
clear whether the dramatic impact of the event in 2006 can be generalized to a mature
emissions market and properly scheduled emissions announcements.
The existing literature on the impact of the emissions announcement on the permit
market is sparse. Chevallier et al. (2009) analyze changes in investors’ risk aversion
around the announcement event in 2007. Gru¨ll and Kiesel (2012) investigate the general
permit price sensitivity and consider the price collapse caused by the release in 2006
as one example of extreme price movements. Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2009)
analyze the impact of decisions on National Allocation Plans (NAPs) on permit prices
and control for the influence of the 2006 and 2007 emissions announcements, but do
not discuss the impact of these events in particular. Conrad et al. (2012) also focus on
NAP events. On classical commodity markets, a series of papers (Linn and Zhu 2004;
Ates and Wang 2007; Mu 2007; Gregoire and Boucher 2008; Le 2008; Bjursell et al.
2010) analyzes the impact of structurally similar events, like the natural gas storage
report or the petroleum status report,98 finding a significant impact of these events on
volatilities of natural gas and crude oil prices.
We investigate the effects of the yearly emissions announcement on the European car-
bon market for an event sample from 2007 to 2012. For that, we analyze market data on
prices, volumes, intraday volatilities, and option-implied volatilities of EUA futures, as
described in the next section. Section 5.2 further describes the details of the emissions
announcement events in our sample. Section 5.3 outlines our analysis and presents the
results.
98These events convey information about the economy-wide inventory of commodities like crude oil and
natural gas. Similarly, information about the economy-wide holdings of unused emission permits is
published by the yearly emissions announcement.
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5.2. Data
5.2.1. Prices and Volumes
We use daily settlement prices and trading volumes of EUA futures from January 1,
2007 to June 30, 2012 for our analysis. In addition to the time period studied in Chap-
ter 4, our sample also covers the year 2007 in this chapter in order to investigate the
impact of the announcement event in 2007 on EUA futures as well. We take Decem-
ber 2008 futures as the relevant contracts in 200799 and consider always the December
futures next to maturity during Phase II, with roll-over on the last day of October ac-
cording to Section 2.3.2. We calculate log returns Rt = ln(Ft/Ft−1) of the futures
prices Ft100 and delete observations on the day after the roll-over from our time series.
Similarly, we consider total traded volumes in the active December contract according
to our roll-over strategy, including screen trading as well as the exchange-for-physical
facilities of the ECX. We express volumes in monetary value by multiplying the daily
number of traded contracts by the contract size of 1,000 EUAs per contract and the
daily settlement price, and denote this time series by V OLUMEt.
Figure 5.2 illustrates our price and volume data and highlights the dates of the emissions
announcement events.
5.2.2. Realized and Implied Volatilities
We measure intraday volatility using high-frequency price data and calculate implied
volatilities based on European options written on EUA futures. For intraday volatilities,
we subdivide each trading day t into 120 intraday 5-minute intervals from 7:00 a.m. to
5:00 p.m. local time enumerated by i = 1, . . . , N and denote the 5-minute log returns
by Rt,i. Then,
RVt = 252
N∑
i=1
R2t,i (5.1)
99We do not consider December 2007 futures since the underlying Phase I EUAs had already lost most of
their value in 2007 due to the large permit over-supply and became completely worthless during that year.
100We deviate from the notation F (t, t) for futures prices in this chapter and denote the price of the active
futures contract by Ft since the maturity t is of no particular relevance for our analysis once the time
series is constructed.
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Figure 5.2.: Daily EUA futures prices and trading volumes quoted in Euros as well as
corresponding log changes from January 1, 2007 to June 30, 2012. Data is
provided by the ECX. The dashed vertical lines mark the release days of
the yearly emissions announcement.
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Figure 5.2 (continued).
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provides a model-free measure of the intraday variance RVt realized at day t, annual-
ized by multiplying by a number of 252 business days per year, and RSDt =
√
RVt is
the corresponding realized standard deviation.101 As Andersen et al. (2001) point out,
this measure reflects the true volatility of returns much more accurately than measures
based on lower frequencies. We use 5-minute intraday price data of EUA futures from
the Thomson Reuters DataScope Tickhistory archive.102
For implied volatilities we build on the model-free approach developed by Carr and
Madan (1998), Demeterfi et al. (1999), and Britten-Jones and Neuberger (2000), among
others. Accordingly, the annualized implied variance IV (t, τ) from t to τ can be cal-
culated based on a continuum of out-of-the-money (OTM) call and put options with
maturity τ and strikes K ∈ [Ft,∞) (K ∈ [0, Ft]), where Ft is the underlying futures
price. Let C(t, τ,K) (P (t, τ,K)) be the price of a call (put) option on EUA futures
with expiry date τ and strike K, and b(t, τ) is the price of a zero bond maturing at τ .
Then, under no-arbitrage, the implied variance is
IV (t, τ) =
2
b(t, τ)(τ − t)
(∫ Ft
0
P (t, τ,K)
K2
dK +
∫ ∞
Ft
C(t, τ,K)
K2
dK
)
, (5.2)
and we denote the time series of implied volatilities ISD(t, τ) =
√
IV (t, τ) con-
structed according to our roll-over strategy by ISDt. Daily settlement prices of EUA
futures options are provided by the ECX. To generate the continuum of option prices
required by the model-free approach (5.2), we linearly interpolate between the Black
(1976) implied volatilities of all available options. In contrast to Chapter 4, we make
use of all available settlement prices regardless of the moneyness and whether the op-
tion is traded on that particular day. The underlying rationale is that interpolating be-
tween all settlement prices provides at least as much information about the model-free
implied volatility as interpolating only between traded options. Still, we clean the data
like in Chapter 4 by excluding options with prices smaller than 0.06 Euros as well as
quotations violating no-arbitrage bounds. For each day within our sample period there
remain settlement prices of at least 5 OTM calls and 6 OTM puts, with 25 OTM calls
and 18 OTM puts on average. Zero bond prices b(t, τ) are inferred from the term struc-
ture of risk-free interest rates as represented by EURIBOR rates for maturities up to
101Since we measure intraday volatility, close-to-open returns are not included into the sum.
102We thank SIRCA for providing access to the Thomson Reuters DataScope Tickhistory archive,
http://www.sirca.org.au.
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Figure 5.3.: Daily realized intraday volatilities and option-implied volatilities of EUA
futures as well as corresponding log changes from January 1, 2007 to June
30, 2012. Realized intraday volatilities are computed using the model-free
high-frequency approach (5.1) based on 5-minute price data provided by
the Thomson Reuters DataScope Tickhistory archive. Implied volatilities
are inferred according to the model-free approach (5.2) from settlement
prices of EUA futures options quoted by the ECX. The dashed vertical
lines mark the release days of the yearly emissions announcement.
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Figure 5.3 (continued).
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one year and EuroSwap rates for longer maturities. For a given maturity, we linearly
interpolate the two interest rates whose maturities straddle it.
Figure 5.3 shows realized intraday and option-implied volatilities. Although realized
intraday volatilities fluctuate much stronger than the longer-term implied volatilities, a
certain comovement is observable. Both time series reach high levels in the first quarter
of 2009, from which they steadily decrease until 2011 before rising again quickly. This
comovement represents the interdependence between implied and actual volatility: Im-
plied volatility predicts future volatility and incorporates information about volatility
realized in the past (see Christensen and Prabhala 1998).
5.2.3. Emissions Announcement Events
The event sample for our analysis consists of the yearly emissions announcements from
2007 to 2012. We do not include the 2006 event due to the special circumstances de-
scribed before. Table 5.1 gives an overview of the event set and the released figures.103
As evidence of the surprise caused by the single emissions announcements, we infer
prior market expectations from a poll carried out by Reuters for the years 2009, 2010,
and 2011, and from Reuters market reports for the other events.104 Although this sur-
prise data is not extensive enough to incorporate it into a quantitative analysis, it allows
to sharpen the conclusions from our empirical results.
After the dramatically large permit surplus for 2005 was announced in 2006, traders
consistently expected a similarly high over-allocation for the following years. Accord-
ingly, it was no surprise that emissions in 2006 were about 125 million tons below
the quotas. The market was similarly long of permits in 2007 (102 million tons), but
this time traders were surprised since this figure meant a slight increase of emissions
compared to the previous year, “contrary to an expected drop”, as reported by Reuters.
Note that these two events were of negligible importance for emission permit prices of
Phase I because a large over-supply was known in 2006 already, and emissions of 2007
103We refer to data from the first official press release after an emissions announcement. In 2007 and 2008,
this data includes emissions from Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. In 2009,
Malta and Romania are added, and in 2010, Bulgaria, Liechtenstein, and Norway are included as well.
104The Reuters poll summarizing market participants’ expectations for the European carbon market was
launched in mid-2008. As of mid-2011, forecasts on economy-wide emissions are not covered by the
poll any more and only price estimates are reported.
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Table 5.1.: Emissions announcement events from 2007 to 2012 and released figures.
On the event date, the European Commission publishes aggregate figures
on emissions realized in the previous year on its website. We refer to data
from the first official press release after the announcement date (European
Commission 2007, 2008a, 2009, 2010b, 2011b, 2012b). Realized emissions
are reported in million tons of carbon dioxide and opposed to the number
of permits allocated for that year (in millions). The difference between both
figures is the resulting permit surplus/shortage for a particular year.
Event Date
Compliance
Year
Compliance
Period
Permits
Allocated
Realized
Emissions
Permits
long/short
Apr 2, 2007 2006 2005-2007 2,152 2,027 125
Apr 2, 2008 2007 2005-2007 2,152 2,050 102
Apr 1, 2009 2008 2008-2012 1,909 2,060 -151
Apr 1, 2010 2009 2008-2012 1,967 1,873 94
Apr 1, 2011 2010 2008-2012 1,994 1,932 62
Apr 2, 2012 2011 2008-2012 2,017 1,899 118
were announced when Phase I was already over. In contrast, the released figures were
of interest as an indication about future emissions in Phase II. In 2008, the first year
of Phase II, it occurred for the first time that realized emissions exceeded the quotas.
The market was short by about 151 million tons, which was at the upper end, but still
within the expectations of market participants ranging from 100 million tons long (Cit-
igroup) to 180 million tons short (IDEAcarbon). This changed again in the following
years due to the financial crisis and the subsequent economic downturn. Adjusting their
forecasts, traders expected the market to be over-supplied by at least 190 million tons
(Deutsche Bank) and at most 60 million tons (Nomisma Energia) in 2009. The actual
figures of 94 million tons, released on April 1, 2010, were within this range of expec-
tations. Emission levels slightly recovered in 2010 and the permit surplus of 62 million
tons was again at the upper end of prior projections, ranging from 50 million tons long
(Nomisma Energia) to 190 million tons long (MF Global). A further continuation of the
economic recovery was expected for 2011. However, the realized emissions, released
on April 2, 2012, “dropped below expectations” as reported by Reuters and were 118
million tons below the quota.
By visual inspection of the price, volume, and volatility time series (see Figure 5.2 and
Figure 5.3) around the event dates, it is not possible to get a clear impression of the ef-
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fects caused by the emissions announcement events. Only for intraday volatility, a peak
at the event day in 2007, 2008, and 2009 is observable, but given the large fluctuation
it is questionable if there is any statistical significance. We define dummy variables for
the event periods to investigate the general impact of the yearly emissions announce-
ment in the next section. D0 is 1 on the actual day of an emissions announcement, and
0 otherwise. In the same way, D−1 and D+1 indicate the day directly before and after
an announcement, and D[−4,−2] and D[+2,+4] stand for the time window from four to
two days prior and subsequent to an announcement.
5.3. Empirical Analysis
5.3.1. Price Impact
The unanticipated price impact of the yearly emissions announcement can be measured
by the magnitude of abnormal performance around the release date. A significant ab-
normal return on the event date would indicate that the release of realized emissions
conveys unanticipated information to the market. Further, abnormal returns on the
subsequent days would suggest an inefficient market that does not incorporate new in-
formation within the same day, while abnormal returns on pre-event days could arise
due to information leakage. We consider abnormal returns based on a mean-adjusted
return model, i.e., the abnormal return ARt = Rt − R̂ on day t is defined as the dif-
ference between the actual return Rt and the mean return R̂ over the sample period.105
Following Ederington and Lee (1996), we perform a dummy regression for absolute
abnormal returns AARt = |ARt| over the whole sample period with event dummies as
defined in Section 5.2.3. The results are reported in the first line of Table 5.2. Indeed,
we observe a significant price impact of the emissions announcement event. Absolute
abnormal returns on days of the realized emissions release are on average about three
times as high as on normal trading days, according to an increase by 0.022 compared
to the normal level of 0.011.106 Furthermore, our results yield no evidence of any in-
105For alternative normal return models we refer to the overview papers by MacKinlay (1997) and Binder
(1998).
106Note that the intercept term of the dummy regression multiplied by
√
pi/2 can also be interpreted as the
general volatility of daily returns, while
√
pi/2 times the coefficient of the event dummy is an estimate
for the additional volatility on event days, see Ederington and Lee (1993). Accordingly, we observe an
overall volatility of 4.14% on event days compared to a volatility of 1.38% without the event window.
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formation leakages or market inefficiencies, so that in general the price reaction only
affects the event day return.
The price impact of an individual event might deviate from this averaged result due to
a particularly small or large surprise effect of the information released. In addition,
the direction of an abnormal return depends on the realized emissions being below
or above market expectations. The magnitude and direction of abnormal returns ARt
for the single events of our sample is illustrated in Figure 5.4. Significant abnormal
returns on the event day can be observed for the years 2008 and 2012, suggesting a
particularly large surprise effect as opposed to the other years. This is in line with
market reports from Reuters as described in Section 5.2.3, stating that in 2008 increased
emissions were released “contrary to an expected drop”, and the realized emissions
announced at the 2012 event “dropped below expectations”. Accordingly, the abnormal
return has a positive sign for the event day in 2008, and is significantly negative for the
2012 release date. For the other events, no significant abnormal returns are observable,
which is in accordance with realized emissions being within the range of analysts’
expectations. Overall, the analysis of the single events confirms the general result that
the announcement of previous year’s emissions has a price impact, the magnitude of
which naturally depends on the surprise effect caused by the information released.
5.3.2. Trading Volume
The impact of a news event is generally not only reflected by the size of abnormal
returns, but also by the trading activity on the release day. Trading volume rises when
important information is released to the market, and the increase is the stronger the
larger the surprise effect of the new information is (see, e.g., Bamber 1986).107 To
investigate the influence of the emissions announcement on trading volumes in emission
permit futures, we follow Ajinkya and Jain (1989) and Mai and Tchemeni (1996) and
consider logarithmic volumes in monetary value ln(V OLUMEt). The event dummy
regression for log volumes yields the results reported in the second line of Table 5.2.
As for abnormal returns, we find a significant effect of the emissions announcement on
Section 5.3.3 provides a detailed analysis of event-induced volatility based on realized intraday volatili-
ties.
107Absolute price changes and volumes are positively correlated in general, not only in the context of news re-
leases. This relationship is found empirically (see Karpoff 1987 for a survey) and predicted by theoretical
models (Holthausen and Verrecchia 1990; Harris and Raviv 1993; Blume et al. 1994).
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trading volumes. On the event day, trading volume increases about 29% according to
a coefficient value of 0.253. In contrast to this extremely high trading activity on the
release day itself, the market is rather calm on the preceding days. Trading volumes
are significantly lower than normal in the window from 4 to 2 days prior to the event
date. Such behavior is known as the “calm before the storm” effect (Jones et al. 1998):
Trading is quiet when the market awaits a large information shock due to a scheduled
public news release.108 A view on the trading volumes around the single events (see
Figure 5.4) confirms that trading activity is higher than normal on the release day in
all cases, whereas the effect is statistically significant only for 2007, 2008, and 2009.
Particularly in 2008, the increased volume corresponds to an abnormal return on the
event day, in line with the claim that “it takes volume to make prices move” (Karpoff
1987). This direct relationship is, however, not that clearly pronounced for the other
events of our sample.
5.3.3. Volatilities
We further investigate the impact of the yearly emissions announcement on actual in-
traday volatilities as well as on option-implied volatilities. In light of our results for
abnormal returns and trading volumes, we can expect increased volatilities on realized
emissions release days.109 Indeed, the event dummy regression results for logarithmic
intraday volatilities ln(RSDt) (see Table 5.2) show that market volatility is signifi-
cantly higher than normal on days of the emissions announcement. A coefficient of
0.515 stands for an intraday volatility on the event day that is 67% above regular levels.
In addition to that, we also observe a “calm before the storm” effect for volatilities, in-
dicated by significantly lower figures from 4 to 2 days prior to the release. Considering
the single events in particular (see Figure 5.5), we consistently observe higher intraday
volatilities on the announcement day in all cases, with statistical significance in 2008,
2009, and 2012. Especially in 2008 and 2012, intraday volatility does not directly revert
to normal on the following day, but persists at an increased level. This shows that an
108For example, French et al. (1989) find empirical evidence of this effect for agricultural futures markets.
109Such an effect is well established in the literature for many different markets and announcement types.
Especially for energy markets, a series of papers (Linn and Zhu 2004; Ates and Wang 2007; Mu 2007;
Gregoire and Boucher 2008; Le 2008; Bjursell et al. 2010) reports on increased volatilities of natural gas
and crude oil futures around the release of the weekly natural gas storage report and the petroleum status
report.
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announcement with significant price impact may cause nervous trading that lasts even
one day after the release.
The behavior of actual volatilities around the event date should be reflected by adjust-
ments of option-implied volatilities. As Ederington and Lee (1996) argue, two effects
are responsible for changes in implied volatilities around news announcements: First,
the expected volatility for any day t is obviously included in the implied volatility on
day t − 1, but not at the end of day t anymore. That means that if the volatility on
event day t is expected to be higher than the average volatility until the options’ ma-
turity, then the implied volatility should decrease from t − 1 to t due to the dropping
out of the highly volatile day. Second, the release of unexpected information could
possibly cause a revision of the expected future volatility. This may affect implied
volatilities in either direction. However, only the first effect is likely to persist when
multiple events are considered, because under rational expectations of market partici-
pants revisions in either direction are equally likely and should cancel out on average.
We consider log changes of implied volatility ∆ ln(ISDt) = ln(ISDt/ISDt−1) and
report results of the event dummy regression in the last line of Table 5.2. Implied
volatilities decrease significantly within the interval from 2 to 4 days after the event.
As argued above, this behavior cannot be explained by revisions of expectations about
future volatility, since it applies on average over all events of our sample. The decline
is consequently attributable to the volatilities expected for the preceding days, which
are no longer included in the option-implied volatilities. This indicates that the market
expects increased volatilities on and around the event day. A possible reason for the
implied volatilities not to decrease earlier than 2 days after the announcement can be
either that the market expects also higher-than-normal volatilities on the days after the
event or that the EUA option market is not completely efficient and reacts with a certain
delay.
Although the behavior of implied volatilities around an individual event can be driven
by both of the effects mentioned, Figure 5.5 suggests for the events from 2007 to
2011 that significant decreases in implied volatility directly correspond to significantly
higher-than-normal realized volatilities around the event. Particularly, the decline of
implied volatilities in 2008 and 2009 subsequent to the emissions announcement is in
line with the thesis that the market expected high volatilities around the event for these
years. As seen before, these expectations were fulfilled and volatilities were high in-
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deed. To the contrary, there is no significant change in implied volatilities in 2007,
2010, and 2011, and realized volatilities are also not significantly increased in these
cases. A different pattern is observable for the 2012 event: Implied volatilities signifi-
cantly increase on the event day as well as on the two following days, hinting that the
information released on April 2, 2012 leads to higher expected permit price volatilities
until the end of 2012. A possible reason is the political uncertainty due to the discus-
sion on a political intervention in the European carbon market that is stimulated by the
unexpectedly high over-supply of emission permits.110 However, the plot of implied
volatilities in Figure 5.3 suggests that parts of this uncertainty prevailed only on the
short run and declined in the following weeks.
110We discuss potential measures of the EU Commission addressing the large permit surplus in the EU ETS
in the conclusion and outlook of this thesis (Chapter 6).
99
Chapter 5. Impact of the Yearly Emissions Announcement
Abnormal Returns
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Figure 5.4.: Behavior of daily abnormal returns and log trading volumes around the
emissions announcement events from 2007 to 2012. Abnormal returns
are calculated based on a mean-adjusted return model as described in Sec-
tion 5.3.1. Time 0 on the x-axis is the release date of the figures on previ-
ous year’s emissions. The x-axis intersects with the y-axis at the value of
the mean abnormal return (or log trading volume, respectively) estimated
within a window from 40 to 11 days prior to the event date. The dashed
horizontal lines represent bounds of significance to the 10% and 1% level
for the standard two-tailed t-test according to Brown and Warner (1980,
1985), based on the variance estimated over the same window.
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Log Trading Volumes
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Figure 5.4 (continued).
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Log Intraday Volatilities
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Figure 5.5.: Behavior of log realized intraday volatilities and log changes of implied
volatilities around the emissions announcement events from 2007 to 2012.
Realized intraday volatilities and option-implied volatilities are calculated
in a model-free fashion as described in Section 5.2.2. Time 0 on the x-axis
is the release date of the figures on previous year’s emissions. The x-axis
intersects with the y-axis at the value of the mean log intraday volatility (or
log change of implied volatilities, respectively) estimated within a window
from 40 to 11 days prior to the event date. The dashed horizontal lines
represent bounds of significance to the 10% and 1% level for the standard
two-tailed t-test according to Brown and Warner (1980, 1985), based on
the variance estimated over the same window.
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Log Changes of Implied Volatility
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Figure 5.5 (continued).
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6. Conclusion and Outlook
In this thesis we study the stochastic behavior of emission permit prices and its impli-
cations for related derivatives from a theoretical and empirical perspective.
Chapter 3 develops a stochastic equilibrium model for emissions markets that accounts
for all important design features of today’s state-of-the-art emission trading systems.
We show that an emission permit can be characterized as a strip of binary options writ-
ten on economy-wide emissions, which induces several properties of the permit price
dynamics. Our model further predicts that the term structure of permit futures prices is
in contango within the compliance periods of an emission trading system, while it ex-
hibits backwardation across compliance periods. Emission permits thus combine char-
acteristics of both consumption and investment assets. As a consequence, standard in-
stantaneous convenience yield models prove to be inappropriate for pricing inter-period
futures since they do not account for this hybrid character and lead to an inconsistent
pricing of futures with different maturities. Calibrating our model to a setting in line
with the EU ETS provides further insights into the specific features of permit prices
and volatilities in the world’s most significant emissions market and allows us to derive
important implications for option pricing. Overall, this chapter reveals how the design
of today’s emission trading systems translates to characteristic properties of emission
permit prices and related derivatives from a theoretical perspective. Our results suggest
that models accounting for the specific design features of the system are better suited
for modeling the price dynamics of emission permits and pricing derivatives in this
market.
In Chapter 4 we derive reduced-form models for emission permit prices that account for
these features and are still feasible for calibration to futures or option prices. Based on
our equilibrium model, we obtain a framework that generically extends the Carmona
and Hinz (2011) two-period market model. We evaluate a battery of different model
variants within our framework regarding their fit to historical futures prices and their
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in- and out-of-sample option pricing performance. A model explicitly accounting for
two compliance periods of an emission trading system and the resulting binary option
characteristics shows the best fit to historical futures prices in the European emissions
market and also overall the best option pricing performance. It particularly outperforms
standard models — as represented by a Black (1976) model within our framework —
and models incorporating only one compliance period of the cap-and-trade system.
These results confirm our theoretical predictions and show that the particular design of
an emission trading scheme and the induced permit price behavior is precisely reflected
by empirical price data.
Chapter 5 investigates the short-term impact of news events on the emission permit
market. We analyze the effects related to the annual announcement of realized emis-
sions on the European market for carbon permits. Our findings show that the emissions
announcement generally leads to significant absolute abnormal returns on the event day,
which are accompanied by increased trading volumes and high intraday volatilities. To
the contrary, trading is particularly calm before the event, as suggested by significantly
lower trading volumes and volatilities. Moreover, evidence from the option market
shows that the high event-day volatility is expected by the market and incorporated in
option prices. Our findings reveal the short-term dynamics of emissions markets and
substantiate that the European carbon market anticipates important news events and
reacts efficiently to new information released.
Current developments of the global emissions market provide interesting starting points
for future research on the stochastic behavior of emission permit prices. In this thesis
we consider the design features of an emission trading system as well as details on
the amount of allocated permits and other important parameters as publicly known and
fixed from the beginning. Recent lessons from existing emission trading systems show,
however, that changes of the economic environment may prompt a readjustment of the
system to new circumstances. A salient example is the prevailing permit surplus in the
EU ETS as a consequence of the financial crisis and the subsequent economic down-
turn, which has driven emission permit prices to levels below 10 Euros. According to
the European Commission, the system was not over-allocated ex-ante and “it was ex-
pected that the ETS phase 2 cap would be ambitious. But the crisis unfolding as of 2008
has radically altered the picture [...]”.111 One could argue that there is no need to read-
111See the report of the European Commission (2012c).
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just the system since a prevailing permit surplus just means that the reduction goals are
reached with high probability, which is naturally reflected by low prices. On the other
hand, the lacking demand for emission permits may lead to a collapse of the market for
an indefinite time. Further, current media reports on the EU ETS show that persistent
low prices on emissions markets are often interpreted as market failure by the public,
undermining the general support for emission trading systems. Finally, it is question-
able if the goal “to promote reductions of greenhouse gas emissions”112 through the EU
ETS can still be maintained when prices are too low to provide incentives for abatement
or long-term investments. For these reasons the European Commission considers ad-
justing the overall allocation of permits for the ongoing Phase III, either by taking a
number of permits out of the system or by strengthening the reduction goals. As an
additional short-term measure, it is proposed to set-aside the allocation of 900 million
permits from the first years (2013 to 2015) of Phase III and to bring them back into
the system at the end of Phase III (2019 and 2020), to increase the scarcity of available
emission permits temporarily. Another example for a readjustment of an emission trad-
ing system is the RGGI system, which has undergone an extensive review in 2012. As
a result, the member states agreed on a reduction of the cap by 45%.113 Current market
reports reveal that this decision has led to a revitalization of the heavily over-allocated
scheme. Although the history of emissions trading is still short, these examples suggest
that adjustments of caps and other design features are the rule rather than the exception.
It appears as a relevant topic for future research to introduce the regulator’s flexibility
of readjusting the system — be it an explicit design feature as proposed by Newell et al.
(2005) or implicitly given by the regulator’s authority — into our model framework and
analyze the consequences for the agents’ strategies and for equilibrium permit prices.
Another tendency in the global development of emissions markets is that political ne-
gotiations to establish price-based environmental policies with a large (geographical)
scope are often delayed or fail. The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol
ended in 2012, and a succeeding policy will not be adopted before 2015. The United
States failed to establish a US-wide emissions trading system since the American Clean
Energy and Security Act of 2009 was denied approval by the Senate. To the contrary,
the supporting entities often implement emissions trading on a smaller, regional level
first, and subsequently elaborate plans to connect these systems to other initiatives in
112See Article 1 of Directive 2003/87/EC.
113See the official announcement of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (2013).
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order to increase where-flexibility for emission abatements. Examples are the cap-and-
trade systems in the states of California and Quebec, which are both in operation since
2013 and will be linked by the beginning of 2014. On a larger scale, Australia and
the European Commission have agreed on linking their systems bilaterally by 2018,114
while EUAs can be imported into the Australian scheme already from 2015 on. Polit-
ical insiders also report that California is in talks both with the European Union and
Australia to link the CA ETS with their systems. In a similar way, it is not unlikely
that China’s domestic emissions trading systems launched in several cities and regions
pave the way for a larger, maybe nation-wide, system. On the long run, political leaders
of China and Australia already envision an “Asia-Pacific carbon market” with possible
members California, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Korea, and China.115 These devel-
opments suggest that emission trading systems of the future are interlinked with each
other in various ways, with significant consequences on the price mechanism in emis-
sions markets. Related effects are considered by Carmona and Fehr (2011) and Barrieu
and Fehr (2011) for the link of the EU ETS to the Clean Development Mechanism as
part of the Kyoto Protocol. Gru¨ll and Taschini (2012) study the price mechanism for
different types of links in a static framework. It seems as a promising direction for
future research to extend the equilibrium model for emissions markets developed in
this thesis to a framework of multiple interlinked emission trading systems to study the
price dynamics of the different emission permits and their correlation structure within
a stochastic dynamic framework. The announced linkages of existing emission trading
systems will provide empirical data to test resulting hypotheses.
114See IP/12/916 of the European Commission (2012a).
115The Australian Minister of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, Greg Combet, outlined his vision of an
“Asia-Pacific carbon market” in his speech at the Australia China Climate Change Forum, see Combet
(2013).
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A. Equilibrium Price Dynamics of
Emission Permits: Proofs
A.1. Optimality Conditions for Individual
Companies
We characterize the optimal trading and abatement strategies (θi, ξi) of the individual
companies for given permit price processes S1(t), . . . , Sn(t). The resulting optimality
conditions relate the company’s marginal abatement costs and the expected penalty
payments to the given permit prices. We first decompose the individual optimization
problem (3.5) into a recursive system of n simpler problems, one for each compliance
period of the emission trading system, including the value function V ik of the period k
problem into the terminal condition of the period k − 1 problem, with V in+1 = 0:
V ik (t, x
i
t, y
i
t, Q
i
k,t, . . . , Q
i
n,t)
= min
(θik,ξ
i
k)
ETk−1
{∫ Tk
t
e−r(s−Tk−1)Ci(ξis)ds+
n∑
j=k
∫ Tk
t
e−r(s−Tk−1)Sj(s)θij,sds
+ e−r(Tk−Tk−1)(pk(xiTk −Qik,Tk)+ + V ik+1(Tk, xiTk , yiTk , Qik+1,Tk , . . . , Qin,Tk))
}
,
(A.1)
for t ∈ [Tk−1, Tk] and k = 1, . . . , n, where (θik, ξik) is the restriction of (θi, ξi) to
the time interval [Tk−1, Tk] and we introduce the additional state variables Qik,t =
k∑
j=1
(
eij +
∫min{t,Tj}
0
θij,sds
)
in generalization of Qik = Q
i
k,Tk
. According to the dy-
namic programming principle (see Bertsekas 1976), an optimal solution (θi, ξi) of the
original problem is also a solution of the decomposed problem (A.1), and V i1 is iden-
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tical to the value function of the original problem for t ∈ [0, T1]. The dynamics of the
state variables follow from (3.4), (3.2), and the definition of Qik,t as
dxit = (y
i
t − ξit)dt+ σiεdW it ,
dyit = µ
i
y(t)dt+ σ
i
y(t)dZ
i
t ,
dQil,t =
l∑
j=k
θil,tdt, l = k, . . . , n.
(A.2)
We derive optimality conditions for the trading and abatement strategy (θi, ξi) by ap-
plying the stochastic maximum principle to the problems (A.1), proceeding recursively
from k = n to k = 1.116 A strategy (θin, ξ
i
n) for period n that minimizes the costs
according to (A.1) maximizes the Hamiltonian
Hn(t, x
i, yi, θi, ξi, ρn) = ρn,xi(t) · (yit − ξit) + ρn,yi(t) · µiy(t)
+ ρn,Qin(t) · θin,t − e−r(t−Tn−1)(Ci(ξit) + Sn(t)θin,t). (A.3)
at every point in time t ∈ [Tn−1, Tn], where (ρn,xi , ρn,yi , ρn,Qin) are the adjoint pro-
cesses corresponding to the state variables (xi, yi, Qin). Differentiating (A.3) with re-
spect to the control variables and setting the derivatives to zero yields the optimality
conditions
∂Hn
∂ξi
= −ρn,xi(t)− e−r(t−Tn−1) ∂C
i
∂ξi
(ξit) = 0,
∂Hn
∂θin
= ρn,Qin(t)− e−r(t−Tn−1)Sn(t) = 0.
(A.4)
It remains to derive the adjoint processes ρn,xi and ρn,Qin , which are defined by the
stochastic differential equations
dρn,xi(t) = ωn,xi(t)dW
i
t + ζn,xi(t)dZ
i
t ,
dρn,Qin(t) = ωn,Qin(t)dW
i
t + ζn,Qin(t)dZ
i
t ,
(A.5)
116See Yong and Zhou (1999), Chapter 3 for a comprehensive introduction of the stochastic maximum prin-
ciple for optimal control problems. For our problem, we apply the stochastic maximum principle for the
case of a non-smooth terminal condition, see Chighoub et al. (2009).
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with stochastic processes (ωn,xi , ωn,Qin , ζn,xi , ζn,Qin) and terminal conditions
ρn,xi(Tn) = −e−r(Tn−Tn−1)1{xiTn>Qin,Tn}pn,
ρn,Qin(Tn) = e
−r(Tn−Tn−1)1{xiTn>Qin,Tn}pn.
(A.6)
We can directly identify the solution117
ρn,xi(t) = −e−r(Tn−Tn−1)Pt
{
xiTn > Q
i
n,Tn
}
pn,
ρn,Qin(t) = e
−r(Tn−Tn−1)Pt
{
xiTn > Q
i
n,Tn
}
pn.
(A.7)
The adjoint processes can be interpreted as the shadow price of the corresponding state
variable. For example, ρn,Qin is the value that can be attributed to having one marginal
unit of period-n permits more. Here, this is the discounted penalty weighted by the
probability of penalties to accrue, which makes perfect economic sense.
Inserting the adjoint processes into (A.4) we arrive at the condition
∂Ci
∂ξi
(ξit) = e
−r(Tn−t)Pt
{
xiTn > Q
i
n,Tn
}
pn = Sn(t), (A.8)
which proves Proposition 1 for t ∈ [Tn−1, Tn] and k = n.
Before proceeding to k = n − 1, note that negative of the adjoint process for a state
variable equals the first derivative of the value function with respect to the same variable
(see Clarke and Vinter 1987), that is
−ρn,xi(t) = ∂V
i
n
∂xi
, −ρn,yi(t) = ∂V
i
n
∂yi
, −ρn,Qin(t) =
∂V in
∂Qin
(A.9)
for t ∈ [Tn−1, Tn).
Now consider the optimal control problem (A.1) for k = n − 1. In this case the
Hamiltonian is given by
Hn−1(t, xi, yi, θi, ξi, ρn−1) = ρn−1,xi(t) · (yit − ξit) + ρn−1,yi(t) · µiy(t)
+ ρn−1,Qin−1(t) · θ
i
n−1,t + ρn−1,Qin(t) · (θin−1,t + θin,t)
− e−r(t−Tn−2)(Ci(ξit) + Sn−1(t)θin−1,t + Sn(t)θin,t), (A.10)
117For the existence of a regular solution we refer to Carmona et al. (2013).
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and as before we obtain the optimum by differentiating with respect to the control
variables and setting the derivatives to zero:
∂Hn−1
∂ξi
= −ρn−1,xi(t)− e−r(t−Tn−2) ∂C
i
∂ξi
(ξit) = 0,
∂Hn−1
∂θin−1
= ρn−1,Qin−1(t) + ρn−1,Qin(t)− e
−r(t−Tn−2)Sn−1(t) = 0,
∂Hn−1
∂θin
= ρn−1,Qin(t)− e−r(t−Tn−2)Sn(t) = 0.
(A.11)
It is left to insert the adjoint processes (ρn−1,xi , ρn−1,Qin−1 , ρn−1,Qin) solving the equa-
tions
dρn−1,xi(t) = ωn−1,xi(t)dW it + ζn−1,xi(t)dZ
i
t ,
dρn−1,Qin−1(t) = ωn−1,Qin−1(t)dW
i
t + ζn−1,Qin−1(t)dZ
i
t ,
dρn−1,Qin(t) = ωn−1,Qin(t)dW
i
t + ζn−1,Qin(t)dZ
i
t ,
(A.12)
with terminal conditions
ρn−1,xi(Tn−1) = −e−r(Tn−1−Tn−2)(1{xiTn−1>Qin−1,Tn−1}pn−1
+
∂V in
∂xi
(Tn−1, xiTn−1 , y
i
Tn−1 , Q
i
n,Tn−1)),
ρn−1,Qin−1(Tn−1) = e
−r(Tn−1−Tn−2)1{xiTn−1>Q
i
n−1,Tn−1}
pn−1,
ρn−1,Qin(Tn−1) = −e−r(Tn−1−Tn−2)
∂V in
∂Qin
(Tn−1, xiTn−1 , y
i
Tn−1 , Q
i
n,Tn−1),
(A.13)
After inserting the derivatives of V in according to (A.7) and (A.9), we identify the solu-
tion
ρn−1,xi(t) = −
n∑
j=n−1
e−r(Tj−Tn−2)Pt
{
xiTj > Q
i
j,Tj
}
pj ,
ρn−1,Qin−1(t) = e
−r(Tn−1−Tn−2)Pt
{
xiTn−1 > Q
i
n−1,Tn−1
}
pn−1,
ρn−1,Qin(t) = e
−r(Tn−Tn−2)Pt
{
xiTn > Q
i
n,Tn
}
pn.
(A.14)
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Using the adjoint processes in (A.11) finally yields the optimality conditions
∂Ci
∂ξi
(ξit) =
n∑
j=n−1
e−r(Tj−t)Pt
{
xiTj > Q
i
j,Tj
}
pj = Sn−1(t),
e−r(Tn−t)Pt
{
xiTn > Q
i
n,Tn
}
pn = Sn(t),
(A.15)
which proves Proposition 1 for t ∈ [Tn−2, Tn−1] and k = n− 1. Proceeding along the
same lines for k = n− 2 to k = 1 completes the proof of Proposition 1.
A.2. Individual Optimality of Global Optimal
Solution
We construct equilibrium permit price processes S1, . . . , Sn through equation (3.8) by
letting the individual abatement strategies ξi driving the economy-wide realized emis-
sions xt be given by the solution of the joint cost problem of the whole economy I .
Then we simplify the joint cost problem to the global problem (3.18) acting on aggre-
gate volumes.118
The joint cost problem is to minimize the sum of the individual companies’ costs ac-
cording to (3.5) by an optimal trading and abatement strategy (Θ,Ξ) = (θi, ξi)i∈I
subject to the market-clearing constraint. Since costs and revenues from individual
trading cancel out on aggregate under market clearing, we obtain the problem
min
(Θ,Ξ)
E0
{∑
i∈I
∫ Tn
0
e−rtCi(ξit)dt+
n∑
j=1
e−rTjpj(xiTj −Qij)+
}. (A.16)
Since in (A.16) the trading strategy Θ is only relevant for the penalty payments (by
entering Qik), we directly observe that a market-clearing trading strategy Θ optimizes
(A.16) if and only if 1{xiTk>Q
i
k} = 1{xTk>qk} for k = 1, . . . , n.
119 On the other hand,
118Our approach partly builds on Seifert et al. (2008) and Carmona et al. (2009). In the appendix of Seifert
et al. (2008) it is shown that the global problem acting on aggregate volumes is equivalent to the sum of
all companies’ individual solutions, under the crucial assumption that all companies’ emissions are driven
by the same Wiener process. By a more general approach, Carmona et al. (2009) prove that the solution
of the global problem is optimal for the individual problems also without this assumption.
119That means, if the number of period-k permits in the whole economy is not sufficient to cover economy-
wide emissions at Tk , companies distribute the available permits in such way that none of the companies
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the abatement strategy Ξ enters both the penalties (through xiTk ) and the abatement
costs. Applying the stochastic maximum principle along the lines of Appendix A.1
yields that an optimal abatement strategy Ξ fulfills
∂Ci
∂ξi
(ξit) =
n∑
j=k
e−r(Tj−t)Pt
{
xTj > qj
}
pj , t ∈ [Tk−1, Tk], (A.17)
for all companies i ∈ I .
Now assume that an optimal abatement strategy of (A.16) is given by (Θ∗,Ξ∗) and
choose permit price processes S∗k , k = 1, . . . , n, by
S∗k(t) =
n∑
j=k
e−r(Tj−t)Pt
{
x∗Tj > qj
}
pj , t ∈ [0, Tk], (A.18)
in line with (3.8), where the asterisks indicate that economy-wide realized emissions x∗t
follow the dynamics (3.9) with abatements ξt =
∑
i∈I
ξit chosen according to the optimal
strategy Ξ∗ of the global problem (A.16).
We show that given the permit price processes (A.18), the optimal strategy (Θ∗,Ξ∗) of
the joint cost problem (A.16) is also optimal for the individual problems (3.5), implying
that S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
n are equilibrium permit prices. For that, expand the expected value in
(3.5) by adding and subtracting the term
n∑
j=1
∫ Tj
Tj−1
e−rtS∗j (t)ξ
i
tdt and split it in two
parts according to
E0
{∫ Tn
0
e−rtCi(ξit)dt+
n∑
j=1
∫ Tj
0
e−rtS∗j (t)θ
i
j,tdt+
n∑
j=1
e−rTjpj(x
i
Tj −Qij)+
}
= E0
{∫ Tn
0
e−rtCi(ξit)dt−
n∑
j=1
∫ Tj
Tj−1
e−rtS∗j (t)ξ
i
tdt
}
+E0
{ n∑
j=1
(∫ Tj
0
e−rtS∗j (t)θ
i
j,tdt+
∫ Tj
Tj−1
e−rtS∗j (t)ξ
i
tdt+ e
−rTjpj(x
i
Tj −Qij)+
)}
.
(A.19)
individually has left-over permits. On the other hand, in case of a permit surplus companies distribute the
permits in such way that none of them has to pay penalties.
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We rewrite the first expectation value as
E0
{ n∑
j=1
∫ Tj
Tj−1
e−rt(Ci(ξit)− S∗j (t)ξit)dt
}
(A.20)
by subdividing the first integral. Obviously, this term is minimized by all abatement
strategies ξi fulfilling
∂Ci
∂ξi
(ξit) = S
∗
k(t), t ∈ [Tk−1, Tk]. (A.21)
Since both an individually optimal strategy and an optimal strategy of the joint cost
problem fulfill this condition (see (3.6) and (A.17)), the resulting value is the same for
both strategies.
To transform the second expectation value in (A.19), note that for an individually opti-
mal strategy we have
e−rTkpk(xiTk −Qik)+
=e−rTkpk1{xiTk>Q
i
k}(x
i
Tk
−Qik)
=e−rTk(S∗k(Tk)− S∗k+1(Tk))
(∫ Tk
0
(yit + n
i
t − ξit)dt−
k∑
j=1
(eij +
∫ Tj
0
θij,tdt)
)
(A.22)
due to (3.7) and we further insert the definitions of xiTk andQ
i
k. Using this in the second
term of (A.19), reordering sums and integrals shows that the control variables cancel
out for an individually optimal strategy and the resulting value is
E0
{ n∑
j=1
e−rTj (S∗j (Tj)− S∗j+1(Tj))(
∫ Tj
0
(yit + n
i
t)dt− qij)
}
. (A.23)
Since the optimal strategy of the global problem also fulfills (3.7), it results in the
same value. Overall, (Θ∗,Ξ∗) solves the individual optimization problems (3.5), and
S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
n are equilibrium permit price processes.
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Finally, we show that the joint cost problem (A.16) corresponds to the simplified ag-
gregate problem (3.18). We have seen that for a solution of (A.16) it holds∑
i∈I
(xiTk −Qik)+ = (xTk − qk)+. (A.24)
Further, define the aggregate abatement cost function C as
C(ξt) =
∑
i∈I
Ci(t, ci
−1
(cj(ξjt ))), (A.25)
where j ∈ I is one arbitrarily chosen single company, ci = ∂Ci∂ξi is the first deriva-
tive of Ci, ci−1 is its inverse function, and ξjt is implicitly defined through ξt =∑
i∈I
ci
−1
(cj(ξjt )). C is well-defined because, first, c
i(ξit) is equal for all companies i ∈ I
for a solution of (A.16) according to (A.17), and second, ci is strictly increasing and
thus invertible due to the convexity of Ci. Together with the differentiability of Ci, it
follows that C is convex and differentiable with respect to ξt and it is∑
i∈I
Ci(ξit) = C(ξt). (A.26)
Therefore, a solution of (A.16) corresponds to a solution of the problem (3.18) acting
on aggregate volumes. Inverting the process, one can also recover a solution of (A.16)
from a solution of (3.18), such that altogether it is equivalent to study the problem
(A.16) or (3.18). The definition of C and (A.17) also directly yields (3.19).
A.3. Derivation of Characteristic PDEs
We decompose the stochastic optimal control problem (3.18) into n simpler problems
as in Appendix A.1, that is we consider the system
Vk(t, xt, yt) = min
ξk
ETk−1
{∫ Tk
t
e−r(s−Tk−1)C(ξs)ds
+ e−r(Tk−Tk−1)(pk(xTk − qk)+ + Vk+1(Tk, xTk , yTk))
}
, (A.27)
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for t ∈ [Tk−1, Tk] and k = 1, . . . , n, where Vk is the value function of the period k
problem, Vn+1 = 0, and ξk is the restriction of the strategy ξ to [Tk−1, Tk].
Each of the single optimization problems in (A.27) can be settled by the standard dy-
namic programming approach along the lines of Sethi and Thompson (2006).120 The
principle of optimality yields
Vk(t, xt, yt) = min
ξt
ETk−1
{
e−r(t−Tk−1)C(ξt)dt+ Vk(t+ dt, xt + dxt, yt + dyt)
}
.
(A.28)
On the other hand, by applying Itoˆ’s Lemma to Vk(t, xt, yt) with dynamics of xt and
yt as given in (3.9) and (3.10) we get
ETk−1{dVk} =
(
∂Vk
∂t
+
∂Vk
∂x
(yt − ξt) + ∂Vk
∂y
µy(t) +
1
2
∂2Vk
∂x2
σ2ε +
1
2
∂2Vk
∂y2
σ2y(t)
)
dt.
(A.29)
Using this in (A.28) leads to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
0 = min
ξt
{
e−r(t−Tk−1)C(ξt) +
∂Vk
∂t
+
∂Vk
∂x
(yt − ξt)
+
∂Vk
∂y
µy(t) +
1
2
∂2Vk
∂x2
σ2ε +
1
2
∂2Vk
∂y2
σ2y(t)
}
. (A.30)
By differentiating the right-hand side with respect to ξt and setting the derivative to
zero we obtain the solution
ξt = c
−1(er(t−Tk−1)
∂Vk
∂x
), (A.31)
where c stands for ∂C∂ξt . By inserting (A.31) into (A.30), we finally arrive at the charac-
teristic PDE
∂Vk
∂t
= −e−r(t−Tk−1)C(c−1(er(t−Tk−1) ∂Vk
∂x
))
− ∂Vk
∂x
(yt − c−1(er(t−Tk−1) ∂Vk
∂x
))− ∂Vk
∂y
µy(t)− 1
2
∂2Vk
∂x2
σ2ε −
1
2
∂2Vk
∂y2
σ2y(t),
(A.32)
120See also Seifert et al. (2008).
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and the boundary condition
Vk(Tk, xTk , yTk) = e
−r(Tk−Tk−1)(pk(xTk − qk)+ + Vk+1(Tk, xTk , yTk)) (A.33)
follows from (A.27).
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B. Reduced-Form Models:
Calculations
B.1. Dynamics of Risk-Neutral Shortage
Probabilities
We derive the dynamics of the risk-neutral shortage probabilities Ak in general and
show that all emissions processes (4.3) satisfying a narrow-sense linear SDE after trans-
formation by a strictly increasing function lead to the same class of dynamics given by
(4.6). For notational ease we omit the k indicating the compliance period in this sec-
tion.
Let Dt(xT |t; .) be the cumulative density function of xT given xT |t at time t. By
definition, it follows
At = 1−Dt(xT |t; q) =: Gt(xT |t). (B.1)
Applying Itoˆ’s Lemma directly yields
dAt = gt(xT |t)σ(t, xT |t)dWt = gt(G
−1
t (At))σ(t, G
−1
t (At))dWt, (B.2)
where gt is the first derivative of Gt. Equation (B.2) describes the general dynamics of
the risk-neutral shortage probabilities.
Aiming at simple dynamics of At, we assume that xT |t can be transformed by a strictly
increasing function υ in such a way that υ(xT |t) follows a linear SDE in the narrow
sense, i.e.,
dυ(xT |t) = (a1(t)υ(xT |t) + a2(t))dt+ b(t)dWt, (B.3)
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where a1 : (0, T ) → R and a2 : (0, T ) → R are continuous, bounded functions and
b : (0, T )→ R+ is continuous and square-integrable. This especially covers a geomet-
ric Brownian motion as proposed by Carmona and Hinz (2011) or the case that lnxT |t
follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process d lnxT |t = κ(µ(t) − lnxT |t)dt + σ(t)dWt.
Given xT |t, we can write υ(xT ) explicitly as
υ(xT ) = e
∫ T
t
a1(s)dsυ(xT |t) +
∫ T
t
e
∫ T
s
a1(u)dua2(s)ds+
∫ T
t
e
∫ T
s
a1(u)dub(s)dWs,
(B.4)
see Karatzas and Shreve (1991), pp. 360–361. Particularly, υ(xT ) is normally dis-
tributed with mean
µυ,T |t(xT |t) = e
∫ T
t
a1(s)dsυ(xT |t) +
∫ T
t
e
∫ T
s
a1(u)dua2(s)ds (B.5)
and standard deviation
συ,T |t =
√∫ T
t
e2
∫ T
s
a1(u)dub2(s)ds. (B.6)
It follows that the cumulative density function is given by
Dt,T (xT |t; y) = Φ
(
υ(y)− µυ,T |t(xT |t)
συ,T |t
)
, (B.7)
and we obtain
gt,T (xT |t) = Φ′
(
υ(q)− µυ,T |t(xT |t)
συ,T |t
)
µ′υ,T |t(xT |t)
συ,T |t
. (B.8)
Inserting into (B.2) yields
dAt = Φ
′ (Φ−1(At)) µ′υ,T |t(xT |t)σ(t, xT |t)
συ,T |t
dWt
= Φ′
(
Φ−1(At)
) e∫ Tt a1(s)dsυ′(xT |t)σ(t, xT |t)√∫ T
t
e2
∫ T
s
a1(u)dub2(s)ds
dWt
(B.9)
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for the risk-neutral shortage probability. Now observe that the dynamics of υ(xT |t) is
also given by
dυ(xT |t) = (υ′(xT |t)µ(t, xT |t) +
1
2
υ′′(xT |t)σ2(t, xT |t))dt+ υ′(xT |t)σ(t, xT |t)dWt,
(B.10)
applying Itoˆ’s Lemma to (4.3). Comparing this to (B.3) yields
υ′(xT |t)σ(t, xT |t) = b(t), (B.11)
and we can write (B.9) as
dAt = Φ
′ (Φ−1(At)) e∫ Tt a1(s)dsb(t)√∫ T
t
e2
∫ T
s
a1(u)dub2(s)ds
dWt
= Φ′
(
Φ−1(At)
) c(t)√∫ T
t
c2(s)ds
dWt
(B.12)
with c(t) = e
∫ T
t
a1(s)dsb(t). Carmona and Hinz (2011) show that for every continuous
function z : (0, T )→ R+ satisfying
lim
t→T
∫ t
0
z(s)ds =∞, (B.13)
there exists a square-integrable continuous function c : (0, T ) → R+ fulfilling
c2(t)∫ T
t
c2(s)ds
= z(t). Therefore we can construct every continuous function z satisfy-
ing (B.13) by the choice a1(t) = 0 and b(t) = c(t). The other way round, c(t) =
e
∫ T
t
a1(s)dsb(t) is a square-integrable continuous and positive function by the proper-
ties of a1 and b, and it follows that z(t) =
c2(t)∫ T
t
c2(s)ds
is positive and continuous and
satisfies (B.13), see Carmona and Hinz (2011).
Altogether, for all dynamics of xT |t for which a strictly increasing function υ ex-
ists such that υ(xT |t) follows a narrow-sense linear SDE (B.3), the class of possible
dynamics for At is completely characterized by (4.6), with a continuous functions
z : (0, T ) → R+ satisfying (B.13). Particularly, all possible dynamics for At can be
obtained by choosing an arithmetic Brownian motion (4.4) for the expected cumulative
emissions process xT |t.
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B.2. Evaluation of Option Pricing Formulae
To calculate theoretical option prices within our reduced-form model framework, equa-
tion (4.14) requires the numerical evaluation of an m + 1-dimensional integral. While
this is straightforward in the one-dimensional case (m = 0), the following transforma-
tions may help to improve computational efficiency for models with more price com-
ponents. We demonstrate these transformations for the case ofm = 1 and an additional
component Rt as well as for m = 2 and Rt = 0.
In both cases, we decompose the bivariate normal distribution as proposed by Carmona
and Hinz (2011) by defining
µ2,c(x1) = µ
2 +
ν1,2
ν1,1
(x1 − µ1) and ν2,2,c = ν2,2 − (ν
1,2)2
ν1,1
, (B.14)
and we can write the integral in (4.14) as
∫
R
∫
R
(e−r(T1−t)Φ(x1)p1 + e−r(T1−t)ex2 −K)+
· ϕ(µ2,c(x1), ν2,2,c;x2)dx2ϕ(µ1, ν1,1;x1)dx1 (B.15)
for the case m = 1 with an additional component Rt or as∫
R
∫
R
(e−r(T1−t)Φ(x1)p1 + e−r(T2−t)Φ(x2)p2 −K)+
· ϕ(µ2,c(x1), ν2,2,c;x2)dx2ϕ(µ1, ν1,1;x1)dx1 (B.16)
for m = 2 and Rt = 0.
Defining K∗(x1) = K − e−r(T1−t)Φ(x1)p1, we note that the inner integral in (B.15)
can completely be settled analytically according to∫
R
(e−r(T1−t)ex2 −K∗(x1))+ · ϕ(µ2,c(x1), ν2,2,c;x2)dx2
=
{
e−r(T1−t)
∫
R
ex2 · ϕ(µ2,c(x1), ν2,2,c;x2)dx2 −K∗(x1), if K∗(x1) ≤ 0;∫
R
(e−r(T1−t)ex2 −K∗(x1))+ · ϕ(µ2,c(x1), ν2,2,c;x2)dx2, otherwise.
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=
{
e−r(T1−t) · eµ2,c(x1)+ ν2,2,c2 −K∗(x1), if K∗(x1) ≤ 0;
e−r(T1−t) · eµ2,c(x1)+ ν2,2,c2 Φ(d1)−K∗(x1)Φ(d2), otherwise.
(B.17)
with
d1 =
µ2,c(x1)− ln( K
∗(x1)
e−r(T1−t)
)√
ν2,2,c
+
√
ν2,2,c and d2 = d1 −
√
ν2,2,c. (B.18)
For (B.16), Carmona and Hinz (2011) show that numerical integration of the inner
integral is only necessary if 0 < K∗(x1) < e−r(T2−t)p2 since outside this interval we
have∫
R
(e−r(T2−t)Φ(x2)p2 −K∗(x1))+ · ϕ(µ2,c(x1), ν2,2,c;x2)dx2
=
{
0 if K∗(x1) ≥ e−r(T2−t)p2;
e−r(T2−t)p2Φ
(
µ2,c(x1)√
1+ν2,2,c
)
−K∗(x1) if K∗(x1) ≤ 0.
(B.19)
Having a solution of the inner integral, it is straightforward again to evaluate the outer
integral of (B.15) and (B.16).
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